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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this study was to investigate the suitability of the Finnish Defence Forces’ 
NH90 helicopter for parachuting operations with the T-10 static line parachute system. The 
work was based on the Army Command’s need to compensate for the reduction in the 
outsourced flight hours for the military static line parachuting training.  
 
The aim of the research was to find out the procedures and limitations with which the 
NH90 IOC+ or FOC version helicopter could be used for static line parachutist training 
with the T-10B/MC1-1C parachutes. The research area was highly complicated and non-
linear. Thus analytical methods could not be applied with sufficient confidence, even with 
present-day computing power. Therefore an empirical research method was selected, 
concentrating on flight testing supported with literature study and some calculated 
estimations. 
 
During three flights and 4.5 flight hours in Utti, Finland on 17 20 September 2012, a total 
of 44 parachute drops were made. These consisted of 16 dummy drops and 28 paratrooper 
jumps. The test results showed that when equipped with the floor mounted PASI-1 anchor 
line, the deflector bar of the NHIndustries’ Parachuting Kit and Patria’s floor protection 
panels the Finnish NH90 variant could be safely used for T-10B/MC1-1C static line 
parachuting operations from the right cabin door at airspeed range of 50 80 KIAS ( 90–
150 km/h). The ceiling mounted anchor lines of the NHI’s Parachuting Kit were not usable 
with the T-10 system. This was due to the static lines’ unsafe behaviour in slipstream when 
connected to the cabin ceiling level. 
 
In conclusion, the NH90 helicopter can be used to meet the Army Command’s requirement 
for an additional platform for T-10 static line parachutist training. Material dropping, the 
effect of additional equipment and jumping from the rear ramp should be further studied. 
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TIIVISTELMÄ 
Tämän tutkimuksen tarkoituksena oli selvittää Suomen Puolustusvoimien käyttämän 
NH90-kuljetushelikopterin soveltuvuus pakkolaukaisulla tapahtuvaan 
laskuvarjohyppykoulutukseen T-10-laskuvarjojärjestelmää käyttäen. Aihevalinta perustui 
Maavoimien tarpeeseen saada NH90-helikopteri hyppykoulutuskäyttöön, tähän 
tarkoitukseen aiemmin osoitettujen ulkoistettujen lentotuntikiintiöiden pienennyttyä. 
 
Tutkimuksen tavoitteena oli määrittää ne menetelmät ja rajoitukset, joilla NH90 IOC+ tai 
FOC -version helikopteria voitaisiin käyttää laskuvarjohyppykoulutukseen T-10B/MC1-1C 
-laskuvarjokalustolla. Aihealue oli fysikaalisesti hyvin monimutkainen, joten laskennallisia 
menetelmiä ei voitu luotettavasti käyttää. Tästä johtuen työ tehtiin empiirisin menetelmin, 
painottuen koelentoihin sekä niitä tukeneeseen kirjallisuustutkimukseen ja analyysiin. 
 
Koelennot toteutettiin Utin Jääkärirykmentissä 17.–20. syyskuuta 2012. 4,5 lentotunnin 
aikana suoritettiin yhteensä 44 koepudotusta, koostuen 16 nukkepudotuksesta ja 28 
koehypystä. Tulokset osoittivat, että NH90-helikopteria oli turvallista käyttää 
hyppykoulutukseen T-10-kalustolla matkustamon oikeasta sivuovesta lentonopeusalueessa 
50–80 KIAS ( 90–150 km/h). Edellytyksenä oli, että koneeseen oli asennettuna lattiaan 
kiinnitetty PASI-1-ankkurihihna, NHIndustries:n laskuvarjohyppyjärjestelmän suojatanko 
sekä Patrian lattiasuojalevyt. Kokeet osoittivat myös, että NHI:n 
laskuvarjohyppyjärjestelmän matkustamon kattoon kiinnitetyt ankkurihihnat eivät 
soveltuneet hyppytoimintaan T-10-kalustolla. 
 
NH90-pakkolaukaisuhyppäämisen osalta tulisi jatkossa tutkia hyppääjien käyttämän 
varustuksen vaikutusta, materiaalinpudotuksia ja perärampin käyttöä. 
 
Tutkielma on laadittu englanninkielisenä huomioiden keskeisen lähdemateriaalin 
vakiintunut termistö ja tarkoitus hyödyntää tekstiä European Defence Agencyn (EDA) 
NH90-käyttäjämaiden tiedonvaihdossa [4]. Työn tietoturvaluokitus on julkinen. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
In early 2012, following a major reduction in the outsourced flight hours for the static line 
parachutist training, the Finnish Defence Forces’ (FDF) Army Command initiated actions to 
have the Army’s own NH90 helicopter approved for this purpose. Otherwise a considerable 
drop was foreseen in the number of static line parachute training jumps, especially for the 
enlisted personnel. The NH90 transport helicopter was a natural choice as the fleet was 
already located in the same Army unit as the paratroopers, the Utti Jaeger Regiment (UTJR).  
The 2001 acquisition contract between the Finland’s Ministry of Defence (MOD) and the 
supplying company NHIndustries (NHI) required the NH90 to be capable for static line 
parachute jumping. Due to various developments during the program this capability was never 
fully substantiated as required by the contract (see extract in Appendix 2’s Figure 28). Until 
2012, only partial evidence was delivered by the NHI using calculations and analysis [10; 11; 
13; 15]. Due to the Army Command’s requirement, the Finnish Defence Forces now needed 
to complete the substantiation, in practice with flight testing, as the first operator worldwide. 
As a preparation for the national qualification of the parachuting system, the FDF and the 
NHI agreed the following: the NHI would deliver a draft test plan for the necessary flight tests 
and the FDF would provide the helicopter, parachutes, jumpers, flight test personnel and other 
required assets. It was also agreed that the NHI was financially responsible for potential test 
related damage and modification costs, if these were caused by the NH90 design 
characteristics. [22] 
The responsibility to carry out the necessary tests was given to the Utti Jaeger Regiment’s 
flight test office. This was the starting point for the research and the author’s involvement in it 
as a flight test engineer. The study was written in English to facilitate information exchange 
within the European Defence Agency’s (EDA) NH90 User Group. The used concepts and 
definitions are clarified in Chapter 1.2 and the terms and abbreviations in Appendix 1. 
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1.1. The question and scope of the research 
The main question of the research was: 
1. With which procedures and limitations can the NH90 helicopter be used for static line 
parachutist training with the T-10B/MC1-1C parachutes? 
The following sub questions were raised to support in answering the main question: 
2. What are the NH90 helicopter and the T-10B/MC1-1C parachute systems? 
3. What are the relevant user and authority requirements for the NH90 static line para-
chuting system and capability? 
4. How does the static line parachuting system, as incorporated in the NH90 helicopter, 
behave during flight tests and what are the possible areas requiring further develop-
ment? 
The scope of the research covered static line parachute jumping with T-10B/MC1-1C 
parachute system from the Finnish Defence Forces’ NH90 Tactical Transport Helicopter’s 
IOC+ version, concentrating on the aircrew point of view. The research emphasis was on the 
flight test planning, test results and the limitations and procedures based on the results. The 
testing was limited to day time visual meteorological flight conditions, jumping from the right 
cabin door, maximum airspeed of 80 knots (150 km/h) and to the maximum jumper weight of 
150 kg. The detailed test setup and conditions are in Chapter 4.1. The paratrooper techniques 
and procedures were only covered to the necessary extent to understand the conclusions. The 
military aviation authority approval process was not covered by more than a brief outline in 
Chapter 3.2, where also the requirements concerning the approval are presented. 
The security classification of this study is unclassified based on the NH90 program’s 
Classification Guide (see Appendix 3) and on the classification of the US Army Field Manual 
for static line parachuting [32], containing comparable level of information. 
1.2. Concepts and definitions 
The concepts requiring specific definition in the study are static line parachute jumping, 
anchor line, incremental approach (in testing), and slip ball. Other terms and abbreviations 
are explained in Appendix 1, with the exception of the most common SI units such as 
“kilogram. These have been assumed as generally known. In expressing numbers, thousands 
are not separated by commas or spaces to avoid misunderstandings among people not used to 
the English convention. For example one thousand is expressed as 1000 (not 1,000 or 1 000). 
The decimal indicator is a dot in the English text and a comma in the Finnish abstract. 
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Static line (SL) parachuting (method) means a system where a line attached to a jump 
platform automatically opens a jumper’s main parachute after exit from the platform. The 
jump platform is usually an airplane or a helicopter. For example the massive airborne 
assaults to Normandy in 1944 were done using the static line parachuting method. See an 
example of military static line parachuting training with the T-10 parachutes in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1. Static line jumping with the T-10 parachute system from a C-130 aircraft. 
In the middle of the picture a jumper has just exited the aircraft. The arced canopy 
suspension lines are exposed and the main canopy has been pulled out from its 
container by the static line (not visible) attached to the aircraft [38] 
Anchor line is a cable or webbing connected to a jump platform (e.g. an aircraft) in order to 
provide a hard point for attaching the jumpers’ static lines. 
Incremental approach is a term used in flight testing to describe a philosophy of progressing 
in small steps from the known to the unknown regime. This is the basic method for 
controlling risks when for example expecting strong non-linear responses or when testing 
complicated systems. Incremental approach is also used to mitigate the adverse effects of the 
so-called “cliff-edge points”, where a small increase in input results in an abrupt and a non-
linear response  often to a dangerous direction and with no preceding warning. 
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Slip ball or slip indicator (Figure 2) is a basic indicator in almost any aircraft where the pilot 
is protected from the airstream and thus cannot feel the direction of the relative wind. The slip 
ball indicates the direction and the relative strength of the side slip of a fuselage. In the 
cockpit a side slip is felt as a lateral force. Normally side slip is not desired, as it creates 
additional drag increasing fuel consumption. Potentially it also increases structural vibrations. 
 
Figure 2. The slip ball or slip indicator is often a combination of a curved tube and 
a ball inside it (mechanical version) or a similar presentation on a display. In this 
picture the slip indicator is part of a “Turn and Bank” indicator [39], an essential 
device in instrument flying. When there is no side slip, the ball is in the middle be-
tween the brackets 
1.3. Research methods 
The main unknown was the dynamic behaviour of the static line + deployment bag 
combination after a parachutist separation. This resulted in an extremely complicated problem 
for the analytical methods. Modelling was needed for the time dependent path of a non-rigid 
body (the static line + deployment bag) in a turbulent airstream with several initial values 
around a complex structural boundary of the helicopter’s fuselage. Based on the author’s 
previous knowledge of the limitations of computational fluid dynamics (CFD), this kind of a 
scenario was practically impossible to solve reliably even with modern computing power. 
Thus a quantitative research method was chosen, based on the empirical observations and 
conclusions made during the ground and flight testing phase. The empirical work was 
supported by literary study and interviews, which provided the input values, initial constraints 
and valuable considerations on the safe conduct of the tests. 
The literary study was the main source of information for Chapters 2 and 3 whereas the 
empirical part is covered by Chapter 4.  
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1.4. The main reference sources and source criticism 
The main reference sources were the NH90 program’s qualification documentation 
concerning static line parachuting system [10; 11; 13; 14; 15] & [21; 22], the NH90 
Interactive Electronic Technical Publication (IETP) [17; 19], Dan Poynter’s “The Parachute 
Manual” [26], U.S Army Field Manual for static line parachuting systems and training [32], 
NHIndustries’ test plan draft for static line jumping [18], Eurocopter’s experimental test pilot 
Didier Delsalle [2], UTJR’s paratrooper instructors’ experiences about similar systems [34] 
and finally the test team’s flight test results [3].  
Majority of the sources were well recognised and had established their position. The author 
considers the sources reliable with the following reservations and considerations.  
The NH90 qualification documentation about the parachuting system was purely analytical 
and based on approximated calculations. Neither Eurocopter nor the NHI had experience on 
dropping static line parachutists from the NH90, especially with the T-10 or a similar system. 
Thus the analysis results (concerning static line behaviour in helicopter slipstream) were taken 
only as initial guesses for the flight test planning.  
The U.S Army Field Manual [32, p. 17-1–18-14] provided solutions for several comparable 
helicopters, UH-1 and UH-60 for example. However, the dimensioning principles were not 
provided, hence the solutions could not be taken as such without complementary analysis.  
The NHI’s test plan draft was very general and not inspected by flight testing professionals. 
This was compensated by the test team’s own experience and by consultation from 
Eurocopter’s highly experienced experimental test pilot Didier Delsalle.  
Finally, the flight test results’ applicability and completeness needed to be kept in mind while 
writing any final conclusions. The number of test points (repetitions) was selected based on 
the test team’s judgment. The random variations were, by experience, believed to have been 
covered with sufficient reliability. The test team consisted of a team of experienced test pilots 
and jumpmasters with thousands of flight hours and parachute jumps, respectively. 
Considering the long experience of the military organisation to utilise the NH90 T-10 static 
line system, this was believed to provide a sufficient certainty for the conclusions.  
Keeping in mind the aforementioned considerations and as the final conclusions are based on 
full scale test results, the outcome of the research is considered reliable and fully applicable 
within the scope of the research (see Chapter 1.1). 
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2. TEST ITEMS 
This chapter presents the main components relevant for the research. The main components 
are the T-10 parachute system (Chapter 2.1), the NH90 TTH IOC+ helicopter (Chapter 2.2), 
the NHI’s Parachuting Kit for the NH90 helicopter (Chapter 2.3) and the specifically designed 
“PASI” prototype floor mounted anchor line (Chapter 2.4). 
2.1. The T-10 static line parachute system 
The T-10-series and MC1-series parachutes are made by the Mills Manufacturing 
Corporation, USA, for military static line airborne operations  see example in Figure 1. The 
T-10-series includes a non-steerable parabolic canopy and the MC1-series a similar but 
steerable canopy. Both have a nominal canopy diameter of 35ft (10.7m). The T-10 system 
was designed in the early 1950’s for the US government for demanding military use and has 
been widely used since with few modifications. [6; 8]  
The T-10 main parachute consists of five major components  the harness assembly, the riser 
assembly, the deployment bag, the pack tray, and the canopy assembly (Figure 3). A reserve 
parachute is used in conjunction with the main parachute and fitted in front of the jumper [32, 
p. 2-1]. The Figure 4 shows the T-10 system as worn by a paratrooper. 
 
Figure 3. Steerable MC1 version of the T-10 parachute system. The components 
clockwise from the left: canopy assembly, harness assembly, the deployment bag 
(including static line), the riser assembly and the pack tray in the bottom middle. 
The T-10 system is identical but without orifices in the canopy [24] 
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Figure 4. T-10 parachute harness fitted on a paratrooper. The main canopy is on 
the jumper’s back and the reserve canopy on his front. On the left the static line’s 
snap hook is attached to the aircraft via an anchor cable and on the right the stat-
ic line’s folding on the main parachute container is shown [32, p. 2-18] 
The T-10B version used by the Finnish Defence Forces originates from the year 1976. The T-
10B features an anti-inversion net at the edge of the canopy (Figure 3) intended to eliminate 
the so called “line-over” malfunctions. The FDF also uses the steerable T-10 variant: the 
MC1-1C. The MC1-1C’s canopy is made from F111 fabric, which provides a smaller rate of 
descent than the T-10B canopy. Otherwise these two  T-10B and MC1-1C  are functionally 
identical from the research point of view, with the exception of static line snap hooks. Details 
of these parachute types are provided in Appendix 4’s Table 6, Table 7 and Figure 31. The T-
10B snap hook connected to the PASI-1 anchor line is shown in Figure 11. 
The static line assembly including all the components shown in Figure 5 is the only part of the 
T-10 system which remains attached to the aircraft after the jumper has exited. The T-10 
deployment bag (D-bag), which is connected to the end of the static line, is constructed of an 
8.8-ounce cotton sateen cloth and its dimensions are 46 x 30 x 13 cm (18 x 12 x 5 in). The 
static line is made of Type VIII yellow nylon and is permanently attached to the D-bag. The 
static line is 4.6 meters (15 feet) long and has a tensile strength of 16.0 kN (3600 lb / 1633 
kg). [32, p. 2-3]. The effective length, up to the pack opening loop is 3.85 meters and the total 
length of the static line assembly up to the end of the deployment bag (locking stow panel) is 
5.3 meters. For static line assembly parts’ nomenclature, see Figure 3 and Figure 5.  
       8  
 
Concerning the use of the static line assembly with a composite-build airframe it is important 
to notice that there are no exposed or hidden metal parts in it, other than the snap hook. It is 
common that the deployment bag hits the aircraft’s fuselage after a jumper has exited and the 
parachute has separated from the bag. However, the lack of metal parts in the T-10 static line 
assembly – as exposed in the airstream – virtually eliminates the risk of impact damage to the 
NH90 helicopter’s carbon fibre fuselage.  
 
Figure 5. Static line and nomenclature on the left [32, p. 2-3]. On the right the stat-
ic line assembly is shown with the green deployment bag (bag body) attached to 
it. The total length of the assembly from the tip of the metallic snap hook until the 
end of the deployment bag (locking stow panel) is 5.3 meters 
2.2. The NH90 helicopter 
The NH90 is a medium sized, twin engine, multi-role military helicopter manufactured by the 
NHIndustries, NHI, which is a consortium owned by three major European aerospace 
companies: Eurocopter, AgustaWestland and Stork Fokker Aerospace. The first NH90 
prototype flew in 1995 and since 2001 the helicopter has been sold to 13 countries worldwide.  
The NH90 is technically very modern. It is the world’s first serial production helicopter with a 
full fly-by-wire flight control system and a full-composite structure. The NH90 fuselage is 
mostly assembled from carbon fibre sandwich structure, but includes also aramid and glass 
fibre parts with titanium and steel reinforcements.  
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The Finnish NH90 variant is specified as TTH TFIA (Figure 6). The abbreviation TTH 
describes the army version “Tactical Troop Transport”. TFIA identifies the national variant: 
“Transport, FInnish Army”. The Finnish NH90 variant is primarily intended for carrying 16 
troops or more than 2500 kg of cargo or conducting search and rescue operations, fire fighting 
and medical/casualty evacuation missions. The TTH variant’s maximum normal take-off 
weight is 10600 kg and the maximum cruise speed 300 km/h. [36] The main characteristics, 
performance values and dimensioning of the helicopter are presented in Appendix 4’s Table 
8, Figure 32 and Figure 33.  
The IOC+ (Improved Operational Configuration) is the latest model delivered to FDF by the 
end of 2012 and is also the version used in this study. The IOC+ lacks some equipment and 
capabilities, but in terms of suitability for parachuting operations it is fully representative of 
the final contracted version, the FOC (Final Operational Configuration).  
 
Figure 6. NH90 TTH TFIA IOC+ (tail number NH-215) in hovering flight. The right 
cabin door is open with the black Parachuting Kit deflector bar installed aft of the 
door on the outside. Some other test relevant items are also pointed out 
Comparing to other helicopters and relevant for this study, the only significant new design 
feature of the NH90 is the composite structure. A composite structure can be made very 
efficient both structurally and aerodynamically, but it is sensitive to any sharp impacts. The 
composite structure is in this respect problematic in that a major internal structural damage 
might look small and insignificant on the surface. For test planning and execution the 
integrity of both the external surface and the internal floor had to be considered. The relevant 
risks and their mitigation are covered in Chapter 4.1.4. and in Appendix 10. 
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2.3. The NHI’s Parachuting Kit for the NH90 helicopter 
The NH90 Parachuting Kit, as introduced by the manufacturer, is specifically intended for 
static line parachuting from the right cabin door. The Parachuting Kit’s main components are 
shown in Figure 7. The other components are the Parachuting Drop Light (PDL) in the cabin 
and cabin signal panel in the cockpit, see Figure 8. The only item not part of the basic TTH 
configuration is the deflector bar (Figure 7), which is for protecting both the door frame and 
the static line from excessive wear. The “anchor lines” in the cabin’s ceiling are for attaching 
the static line snap hook but also the loadmaster’s safety strap. [14] See Appendix 4, Figure 
33 for a detailed diagram of the ceiling cable location.  
The boarding and maintenance steps in Figure 7 are part of the normal NH90 configuration, 
but they are mentioned in conjunction with the Parachuting Kit as they help the jumpers to 
exit the helicopter. The boarding step also bears loads caused by the static line, see Figure 24.  
The strength substantiation for dynamic loads has been presented in references [11; 13] and 
[15]. The behaviour of the attached T-10 static line in slipstream after jumper separation has 
been estimated by analysis in [10]. The part numbers and weight breakdown of the 
Parachuting Kit is in Table 9 of Appendix 4.  
 
Figure 7. Parachuting Kit main components as viewed from the forward right side 
of the fuselage (H/C nose on the right) [15, p. 8]. Not shown component is the 
Parachuting Drop Light control panel in the cockpit. The deflector bar (Static Line 
Protection Kit) exists to prevent static lines getting caught by outboard installa-
tions or getting damaged by any sharp edges [13, p. 4] 
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Figure 8. Parachuting Drop Light (PDL) panel is on the left and its control panel (in 
cockpit) on the right. The green (“JUMP”) and yellow (“STAND-BY”/ “STOP”) 
lights have been symbol coded to be readily readable even if operating with 
NVGs. [14, p. 13] When approaching the jump site the cockpit crew selects CAB-
IN SIGNAL switch to AMBER illuminating amber light on the cabin PDL, meaning 
“STAND-BY” (or “STOP/ABORT” if lit after GREEN light). At the exit point GREEN 
position is selected, which illuminates green light on PDL and initiates an audio 
tone 
When using the T-10 system the major challenge with the NHI’s Parachuting Kit is illustrated 
in Figure 9. In the Figure 9 a T-10B static line, visible in the middle, is attached to the cabin 
ceiling anchor lines. The static line, including the deployment bag extends approximately 4 
meters out of the door. There are several potential items – marked with circles  which might 
get damaged by the tightening (“start”), up-swinging (“max”) or trailing static line (“trim”). 
See the respective calculated positions of the static line in Figure 10. According to the 
analysis 80 knots would be the most critical case in terms of main rotor clearance whereas 40 
knots would provide the safest outcome. However, 80 knots is much more desirable from the 
parachutists’ point of view than 40 knots: the faster the airspeed, the faster the parachute 
opening. The slipstream “feel” during exit is then also better comparable to fixed wing 
aircraft. 
Before the start of the tests, the item most probably damaged was thought to be the right 
position light at the forward-right edge of the sponson. The most dangerous contact possibility 
was with the main rotor blades. The main rotor has a strong structure and an enormous inertia.  
Therefore the main rotor blades would probably be much affected by a tangled static line. 
However, if the tangled static line would rip out of the door the anchor cables (lines) 
including all the other static lines, that would be very dangerous situation. This risk could be 
avoided by attaching the static lines to the cabin floor as in many other jump aircraft, 
including US Army’s UH-1 and UH-60 Blackhawk [32, p. 17-4 & 17-8]. As a method of risk 
mitigation and in accordance with the incremental approach philosophy, the floor anchor line 
was implemented for the first drops during the flight tests. This is further elaborated in 
Chapter 2.4. 
       12  
 
 
Figure 9. The potential damaging aircraft items (circled, solid and dashed) due to 
static line dynamic behaviour during and after parachutist exit. The light blue dash 
line circles indicate items that might be damaged if the static line would be at-
tached to the floor 
 
Figure 10. The static line (SL) positions at Start (parachutist separates), Max (high-
est point of static line and bag) and Trim (final position in slipstream) for 40, 60, 
80 and 100 knots according to NHI’s calculations [10, p. 8] 
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2.4. “PASI”–Prototype Anchor for Static line Implementation 
The attachment of the static line to the standard anchor line in the ceiling was analysed to 
cause a risk of inadequate static line deployment bag – main rotor clearance at airspeeds 
between 63 and 97 KIAS (knots, indicated airspeed) [10, p. 9]. The risk of a static line vs. 
main rotor contact was eliminated by the test team by manufacturing a prototype anchor line, 
to be mounted onto the cabin floor at least for the first drops. A greatly increased safe static 
line vs. main rotor separation could then be achieved. The Prototype Anchor for Static line 
Implementation (PASI, Figure 11 and Figure 12) provided also a safe mean to validate the 
analysed results of static line upswing Figure 10. After the first observations an entry into the 
more risky regime (ceiling anchor attachment) could then be made, as feasible.  
The prototype anchor line was designed and manufactured in Utti Jaeger Regiment in 
cooperation with the author and an FAA Master Rigger certified FDF jumpmaster. Prototype 
anchor’s installation was authorised by Finnish Air Force Material Command (FINAF AMC) 
with the TMT installation order AM/132/NH, 12.9.2012, see Appendix 5’s Figure 35.  
 
Figure 11. Prototype Anchor for Static line Implementation, version 1 (PASI-1) at-
tached to the front left part of the cabin, onto two “green” attachment points below 
the row of troop seats. In bottom right, a T-10B static line’s snap hook is shown 
The prototype anchor line and its method of attachment are dimensioned for the worst loading 
case in parachuting operations as presented in the NHI’s analysis. This scenario assumes a 
malfunction, where an exiting jumper weighing 150 kg would get tangled to the static line at 
4.2 meters, between the pack opening loop and the deployment bag. Then the jumper’s 
velocity would be 9.78 m/s and the resulting peak pulling force on the static line when 
stopping the jumper’s fall 11.76 kN (equalling 1200 kg). [11, p. 15]  
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This kind of a malfunction is considered possible in theory and taken as the design loading 
case also for the FDF tests, even though its probability of occurrence is very small. For 
example: in Finland no such case is known during the history of military or civilian 
parachuting, while hundreds of thousands of static line jumps have been made. 
The PASI’s attachment onto the floor has a coefficient of safety (CoS) of 1.4 against the limit 
load of the tie-down points (see Figure 34 of Appendix 4). By definition, up to the limit load 
no deformation of structure is expected. The minimum coefficient of safety against the 
ultimate load (“break load”) of the floor attachment is 2.1. The ultimate strength of the cabin 
floor’s attachment points is 25kN. 
The prototype anchor’s design is simple. It provides the lowest possible loading on the floor 
attachment points, has little risk for tangling due to its positioning and can easily be stored 
away from the middle of the cabin floor. The minimum tensile strength of the anchor and any 
of its components is 22.3 kN (2270 kg, 5000 lbs), resulting in the minimum CoS of 1.9 for the 
“PASI” in the design load case. Two versions of the prototype anchor were made for the tests: 
a shorter one (PASI-1) and a 50 cm longer one (PASI-2). The length of the PASI-1 anchor 
was designed based on judgment by experience so that only the minimum reasonable length 
of the static line would be exposed out of the door. This was balanced with the requirement of 
having a sufficient length for safe canopy vs. fuselage separation. The two anchors could then 
be used to quickly modify the trailing deployment bag’s location in slipstream during the tests 
if problems were encountered. The prototype anchor components are listed in Table 10 
(Appendix 4). 
 
Figure 12. The PASI-1 anchor line and two separate Quick Release Cargo Rings, 
commonly used in transport aircraft. See list of components and their specifica-
tions in Table 10 (Appendix 4). The total length of PASI-1 is approximately 1 me-
tre. 
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3. REQUIREMENTS FOR THE SPECIFIC PARACHUTING SYSTEM 
The applicable requirements are divided in two categories: user and authority requirements. 
The user requirements cover mostly the functional and maintenance aspects whereas the 
authority requirements cover the airworthiness aspects. There is however some overlap 
between the two categories.  
In this chapter the word shall is used to denote an essential, mandatory requirement that must 
be fulfilled. The word should is used to indicate an optional requirement, where fulfilment is 
desired but not mandatory. 
3.1. User requirements 
The end user for the NH90 TFIA’s parachuting system is Utti Jaeger Regiment. Operating the 
parachuting system is always a joint task for the Special Jaeger Battalion’s paratroopers and 
the Helicopter Battalion’s aircrew. The user requirements – combining both the paratrooper 
and the helicopter operator’s point of view  can be formalized from the test plan as follows 
[29]: 
1. The NH90 parachuting system shall allow dropping static line parachutists equipped 
with T-10B or MC1-1B parachute systems at an airspeed of at least 60 knots (110 
km/h), with a desired minimum airspeed of 80 knots (150 km/h) 
2. The jump procedure shall be suitable (simple, robust) for the training of conscript par-
atroopers 
3. The jump procedure shall enable jumping with rucksacks and similar, up to a maxi-
mum paratrooper exit weight of 150 kg. 
4. The jump procedure shall enable adequate working facilities in the cabin for two 
jumpmasters and one loadmaster in addition to the paratroopers 
5. The jump procedure shall not mandate any structural or other significant modifica-
tions (like shortening of the static line) to the standard parachute system 
6. The jump procedure shall not compromise the helicopter’s structural integrity, or 
cause significant additional maintenance burden on either the helicopter parts or the 
parachute static lines or other parts due to excessive wear and tear 
7. The jump procedure should enable loads of at least eight and stick of at least four par-
atroopers and the procedure should not set any additional weather constraints com-
pared to those generally regulating parachuting operations. 
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These user’s requirements apply for “Phase I” clearance of the T-10 system. Later phases 
include tactical items and other equipment. However, the foreseen updates due to later tests 
concern only the aforementioned requirements number 1 and potentially 3. 
3.2. Authority requirements 
The approval of any system to be installed in a Finnish military aircraft is governed by the 
military airworthiness requirements and advisories established by the Finnish Military 
Aviation Authority, FIMAA. In airworthiness issues it is assisted by the Quality and 
Airworthiness department (LLOS) of the Finnish Air Force Material Command. 
In leading principles the Finnish military airworthiness regulations are rather similar to 
civilian airworthiness regulations like the FAR-29 commonly used as reference for large 
civilian transport helicopters. For the scope of this study the relevant FIMAA requirement 
documents are the Military Aviation Advisory SIO-Ma-Lt-005: “Airworthiness requirements 
for military aircraft” [30] and Military Aviation Regulation SIM-Ma-Yl-013: “The approval 
and maintenance of parachutes and safety equipment used in military aviation” [31]. The 
requirements of the latter document are in practice covered by SIO-Ma-Lt-005. Therefore 
SIM-Ma-Yl-013 is not referenced in the list below. Both document headers are translated 
from Finnish as no official English translations were found.  
In brief, the relevant authority requirements for the static line parachuting system used in this 
research are as follows (translated from Finnish): 
1. The NH90 parachuting system shall be airworthy, i.e. it must be so designed, manu-
factured, equipped and maintained that it can be safely used for aviation (Chapter 2.2 
of [30]); 
2. The system shall meet its specification. The safety relevant and essential characteris-
tics and features have to be substantiated empirically (Chapter 6.2 of [30]); 
3. The system shall be type inspected and approved for its intended use (Chapter. 2.3 and 
6.1 of [30]. Author’s note: The responsible for managing and controlling the type in-
spection and approval is the aircraft type certificate holder – in this case the Finnish 
Air Force Air Material Command). 
4. The qualification shall cover and present, as applicable, the following items (Chapter 
6.2.1 of [30]): 
o Type marking (name, type number etc.) and modification state; 
o Effect on weight, centre of gravity, moment of inertia; 
o Main dimensions; 
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o Structure and components; 
o Method of operation; 
o Performance characteristics; 
o Requirements for installation;  
o Effects on other aircraft systems; 
o Reliability; 
o Safety; 
o Inspection, maintenance, repair, transport and storage requirements; 
o Instruction, training and user competence requirements. 
5. If flight testing is required for substantiation, a test plan shall be made. It must include 
among others the test limitations and safety instructions (Chapter 8.2 of [30]). 
The authority approval process goes – in brief – as follows: After it has been substantiated 
and shown that NH90 static line parachuting system fulfills the listed airworthiness 
requirements and the user requirements in the previous chapter, a type inspection certificate or 
another applicable documents (for small changes) is issued by the FINAF Air Material 
Command, usually by its Quality and Airworthiness Division (LLOS). The system is then 
normally released to line service using the FDF’s TMT system. The TMT can be explained as 
“airborne systems related technical change and information data system”, which manages 
airborne systems related documents between the type certificate holder and the end users.  
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4. CONDUCT OF THE TEST AND TEST RESULTS 
4.1. Test setup 
The draft test plan delivered by the NHI on 9 May 2012 [22] was complemented and finalized 
by the UTJR flight test office, with valuable consultation from experimental test pilot Didier 
Delsalle of the Eurocopter Flight Test Department [2]. As the planned tests included many 
unknown and potentially hazardous factors, the final test plan [29] incorporated an 
incremental approach (Chapter 1.2) to minimise the risks for personnel, helicopter and 
equipment. Parachuting experience with the FDF’s earlier Mi-8 transport helicopter [41] as 
well as already developed free fall jumping methods for the NH90 [40] were also utilised in 
the planning. 
4.1.1. General arrangement and test conditions 
All testing took place on Utti airfield, Finland on 17 20 September 2012. The standard 
ground preparations for static line jumping as per the FDF rules and regulations were 
observed. The airfield emergency rescue service was available in normal readiness. One 
UTJR’s MD500 helicopter was used as a chase aircraft to assist the test aircraft’s crew as 
additional eyes and for documenting the test using a video camera. Emergency landing pad 
was prepared (but not assembled) for the unlikely case of landing gear extension failure due to 
static line entanglement. Other general test conditions are shown in Table 11 (Appendix 6). 
Complementing to what is mentioned in Table 11, for each test the aircraft configuration 
included: 
 A fully operational Parachuting Kit, see Chapter 2.3; 
 15 standard TTH troop seats configured as shown in Figure 19; 
 Patria cabin floor protection panels (to avoid dents due to static line hooks slamming 
the floor after exit), Figure 13; 
 “PASI” anchor line (1 and/or 2 as applicable) and the tape protections in accordance 
with AM/132/NH, Appendix 5; 
 Protective tape as shown in Figure 13 and Figure 14 and a video camera at the cabin 
door, see Figure 15. 
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The flight tests were documented using simultaneously four video cameras: one fixed at the 
forward edge of the right cabin door (Figure 15), one in the cabin used either by the flight test 
engineer (FTE) or the loadmaster (LM), one in the chase helicopter and one on the ground. 
Part numbers of the test relevant aircraft items are presented in Table 12 of Appendix 6. 
4.1.1. Test equipment and assisting devices 
The following modifications and installations were done to the test helicopter. The standard 
composite floor was protected by plywood protection panels (P/N PNH252300010) made by 
Patria Aviation, Halli. The total weight of the panels was 40 45 kg and the total thickness 8 
mm (4 mm plywood + 4 mm padding). [5] As the protection panels had coarse anti-slip strips, 
the door side edge of the panels was covered with a combination of aluminum tape and duct 
tape, Figure 13. This abrasion layer prevented damage to the static lines during jumps.  
 
Figure 13. The right side cabin boarding step with Patria’s floor protection panels 
and the abrasion taping installed. The aluminium or “high-speed” tape was of the 
following type: 3M, width 50 mm, P/N 425 BWB 1194-38. The duct tape type was 
Würth 50 mm x 50 m SUPERBLACK, P/N 1985 505 05 
Some aluminium tape was also added to round up other sharp features as the front edge of the 
search light below the right sponson and the hatch of the SSU3 access door on the right aft 
fuselage, see Figure 14. 
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Figure 14. Test setup with aluminium tape: right search light assembly front edge 
(rounding), SSU3 hatch’s butterfly nut (rounding) and maintenance step (secur-
ing). Two reference lines were also added to the right aft fuselage to ease the 
monitoring of static lines’ vertical position from the chase A/C 
For documenting all the exits and the static lines’ behaviour after jumps, a video camera was 
temporarily installed below the winch man trim (WTR) unit at the forward edge of the right 
cabin door, see Figure 15. The camera was attached with three cable ties and secured with one 
safety wire to the WTR. The camera was set up at the smallest possible resolution of 640x480 
pixels, which provided continuous recording for 55 min. Installation sideways provided 
maximum viewing angle along the fuselage in horizontal direction, which was of main 
interest due to the estimated static line movement path. 
                          
Figure 15. Contour HD 1080p digital video camera, facing towards the tail of the 
helicopter, installed with cable ties below the Winch Man Trim (WTR) unit 
The parachutist test dummies used by FDF are shown in Figure 16. The size of the dummies 
is as follows: height 102cm, width 50cm and thickness 30cm. The weight of one dummy is 
100 kg. 
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Figure 16. The parachutist test dummies used by the FDF. On the right a dummy is 
shown at the cabin door with the T-10 harness on. Two people are normally re-
quired to handle the 100 kg dummy and push it from the door 
The jumpmasters, loadmaster and the flight test engineer as well as the cockpit crew were all 
connected to the helicopter’s intercommunication system (ICS) with NH90 compatible Alpha 
helmets (Figure 17). The ICS connection points for the cabin personnel were as follows: the 
loadmaster used Master Station Unit 3 (MSU3), the jumpmaster 1 (JM1) MSU6 and the 
jumpmaster 2 (JM2) used Secondary Station Unit 1 (SSU1). Both the loadmaster and the two 
jumpmasters used loadmaster harnesses. LM was secured at the right side guidance cable 
(anchor line), JM2 was secured to the left side guidance cable and the JM1 to floor cargo 
attachment point at the LM seat position. For the occupants’ positioning on the cabin during 
flight, see Figure 19. The aircrew used emergency parachutes in combination with life vests, 
Figure 17. This parachute could also be worn in combination with the Cabin Safety Harness, 
CSH 2-1560 (Airsafe Sweden Ab), see Figure 18. The installation orders for the use of the 
emergency parachutes and the safety harnesses are in Appendix 5’s Figure 36 and Figure 37, 
respectively. 
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Figure 17. Helmet Integrated System Ltd’s Alpha-helmet (P/N: SCA0079946), Pio-
neer Aerospace Corporation’s emergency parachute (P/N 2711-519) and Beau-
fort Ltd’s Helicopter Flight Jacket (P/N: A356800A01/2/3) worn by a crew member 
 
Figure 18. Emergency parachute worn with Airsafe Sweden ab’s Cabin Safety Har-
ness CSH 2-1560. The connection point for the attachment strap is visible at the 
back below the parachute container 
4.1.2. Flight envelope and test limitations 
All tests were done in day time visual flight rules (VFR) conditions in straight and level 
flight, with the exception of side slipping during the test item #2 (Chapter 4.2.2). The jumps 
with dummies and jumpers were flown with the slip ball centred (without side slip). All tests 
were flown with the ATT flight control mode. 
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The following envelope was covered by the tests: 
 Airspeed range: 40…80 KIAS; 
 Sideslip: -2/3…+2/3 ball (for static line tow test, item #2, Appendix 6’s Table 11); 
 Altitude: between 1000 ft AGL (dummy drops) and 3000 ft AGL (approximately 1050 
and 3050 ft respectively with the standard pressure setting 1013 mbar); 
 Ground wind and turbulence: up to 15 knots (8 knots during jumps), no turbulence; 
 Outside air temperature: +13°C…+15°C. 
The NH90 flight manual limitations were observed, except for the Parachuting kit / Guidance 
cable limitation: “Parachute jumping using the parachute kit is not allowed” [20, p. O-86]. 
This limitation existed because the system was not yet qualified by the NHI. The test plan 
authorised ignoring this limitation [29]. 
The complete list of the test limitations is presented in Appendix 7.  
Based on the risk analysis (Appendix 10) it was also decided that parachutes were worn by 
test aircraft crew during the first drops with dummies and personnel. During these first drops 
the jump altitude was 3000 ft AGL to facilitate reasonable possibilities for emergency egress 
for the crew. 
4.1.3. Aircraft loading 
Flight Manual weight and centre-of-gravity (CoG) envelope were observed during the tests. 
Figure 19 illustrates a typical loading case for the initial climb and on the jump run. The 
figure also shows the jumpers’ exit order, movement directions and other personnel’s 
positioning in the cabin. These all were defined by the test team during the ground test phase. 
Figure 20 from an early test session visualises the exit position and the static lines’ routing in 
the cabin. 
Example calculations for mass and centre-of-gravity are provided in Appendix 8. As a 
summary, no CoG limitations existed for jumpers’ seating order or exit positioning in any 
practical combination, assuming a jumper’s average maximum weight of 100 kg. When the 
jumpers would be equipped with heavy rucksacks (assumed exit weight 150 kg), the 
longitudinal and lateral CoG could in theory be exceeded in some cases. These cases are taken 
into account in the test limitations, listed in Appendix 7. 
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For repeatability of the results, the height and weight of the jumpmasters, loadmaster and the 
maximum and minimum height of the paratroopers is documented in Appendix 6, Table 13. 
 
Figure 19. The seat configurations for 15 troop seats and an example of positioning 
in the cabin during the flight. The example load includes 10 parachutists, two 
jumpmasters, a loadmaster and the test conductor (FTE). JM = Jumpmaster, LM 
= Loadmaster, FTE = test conductor / videographer. Floor drawings are from [5] 
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Figure 20. Ground demonstration of a four-man stick exit. Note that the static lines 
have too much slack in this test situation. On the right is the estimated positioning 
of the static lines after parachutist separation – there is no interference with the 
exiting jumpers 
4.1.4. Text matrix and risk assessment 
The master test matrix is in Appendix 9. The aircrew  an experimental test pilot, a co-pilot, 
an FTE and a loadmaster  participated in all the tests. A chase helicopter with a videographer 
took part in all the flight tests. The jumping took place from the right cabin door only. All 
other doors and hatches were closed on the jump runs. 
The risk analysis summary is presented here. Its details and the description of the hazard level 
determination and residual risk classification is presented in Appendix 10. The three most 
important unknown hazard factors were:  
1. Static line up-swing at different airspeeds, especially the minimum vertical clearance 
with the main rotor; 
2. Static line contact with the fuselage after parachute separation and the potential subse-
quent damage; 
3. Static line or deployment bag entanglement in helicopter lower fuselage projections 
during jump or when being pulled in by the jumpmaster. 
The risk mitigation concentrated especially on these three cases. The first point was managed 
by starting the tests with the safest airspeeds as indicated by the Industry analysis [10], using 
the floor anchor line at least for the first drops and by attaching only one static line to the 
anchor for the first tests. The second point was managed by starting with the lowest airspeeds 
(the least energy for up-swing), using the floor mounted anchor line for the first tests and 
taping any hazardous extruding aircraft parts. The third point was covered by first flying the 
static lines only, checking their behaviour in the slipstream for various possible end-state 
positions and by a careful JM/LM cooperation during the static lines’ retraction phase. 
Finally, if a static line would have gotten entangled, the crew could have aborted the testing 
and landed. 
After the risk mitigation actions, the worst residual risk consisted of a small probability for 
aircraft damage and/or personnel injury (risk category B). This meant that the risk level was 
higher than in normal flight service but acceptable.  
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4.2. Test results 
The following chapters – 4.2.1 through 4.2.4 – present the test results in writing and with sets 
of video snap shots. The video recordings are available on request from the flight test office of 
Utti Jaeger Regiment’s Helicopter Battalion. The comparison between the calculated and the 
actual static line dynamic behaviour is presented in Appendix 11. 
4.2.1. Test #1: Ground assessment 
The test is outlined in master test matrix item #1 in Appendix 9. The main outcome from test 
the item #1 (Ground assessment) was verifying the occupants’ positioning and movement 
routes in the cabin as well as the test equipment installation, personnel actions and 
communication during all phases of the flight, including emergencies. During ground tests 
also the methodology for dropping the dummies was checked and practised. For example the 
setup presented in Figure 19 was consolidated during Test #1. 
Concerning the test items, the fit of the Parachuting Kit’s deflector bar’s two middle 
attachment points were excessively tight, possibly due to paint layers. When installing the 
deflector bar with a standard 200g maintenance hammer it was considered questionable 
whether the attachment points’ integrity would endure repeated removals and installations. 
This feature was however acceptable for further testing. 
4.2.2. Test #2: Static lines’ behaviour in slipstream 
The test is outlined in the master test matrix item #2 (Appendix 9). The testing was initiated 
with assessing the behaviour of the T-10 static lines in slipstream with all the three anchor 
line versions: PASI-1, PASI-2 and NHI’s guidance cables. The airspeed range was 40 80 
KIAS. The loadmaster released the static lines manually and incrementally into the airstream, 
monitoring their behaviour during various amounts of side slip induced by the pilot. See 
examples of the side slip tests at 40-50 knots in Figure 21 and in Figure 22. The test results 
for PASI-1, the shorter floor anchor line are in Table 1 and Table 2, the results for PASI-2 (50 
cm longer floor anchor line) are in Table 3 and the results for the NHI’s anchor line are in 
Table 4. 
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Table 1. Test results for PASI-1 (short, floor mounting) with one static line 
Test case 
Airspeed 
(KIAS) 
Observations 
One static line 
below the spon-
son 
40 
Slip ball centred: The static line circled clockwise (looking aft from the 
door) with a diameter of 2 m so that the D-bag slightly contacted the 
sponson-fuselage junction’s lower surface at the top of the rotation. With 
the slip ball 2/3 to the left, the D-bag moved to circle below the sponson 
and with slip ball 2/3 to the right, the D-bag moved below the fuselage. 
50 
Compared to 40 KIAS, the D-bag stabilised and the circle diameter 
diminished to 0.5 meters. With slip ball ½ to the left, the static line 
slightly touched the main landing gear (MLG). 
60 
At 60 KIAS the circling was slow and basically just small sideways 
movement between the MLG and the fuselage-sponson junction, 
amplitude 20 cm. With slip ball ½ to left, the D-bag just crossed the 
MLG tyre line. With ball ½ to the right, the D-bag moved at the fuseage-
sponson junction. 
70 The D-bag circled in an ellipse: width 1.5 m, height 0.5 m. 
80 
The D-bag circle diameter diminished to 0.5 m, but the frequency 
increased. Slip ball ± 2/3 moved the D-bag between MLG tyre and 
sponson-fuselage junction. 
One static line 
above the spon-
son 
40-50 
The D-bag reached just over the sponson in longitudinal direction, at the 
RWR sensor level. The static line rested without motion above the 
sponson’s coarse strips and flapped against the end of the sponson. 
With slip ball ½ to left, the bag moved against the fuselage. With ½ to 
right, the SL moved 5 cm inwards from the formation light. 
60->80 
Accelerating from 60 KIAS, the flapping increased. With slip ball ± ½ the 
D-bag remained between the fuselage and RWR sensor. When reeling 
in, the bag started to circle rapidly and violently at Chaff and Flare 
Dispenser (CFD) level. 
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Figure 21. One static line + D-bag below the sponson at 40 50 KIAS with PASI-1. 
On the left the situation with slip ball on the left (side slipping to the left) and on 
the right with slip ball on the right (side slipping to the right) 
 
Figure 22. One static line + D-bag above the sponson at 40 50 KIAS with PASI-1. 
On the left is the situation during side slip to the left (i.e. slip ball on the left).  The 
static line is leaning onto the formation light. On the right is the static line’s posi-
tion during side slip to the right.  
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Table 2. Test results for PASI-1 (short, floor mounting) with four static lines 
Test case 
Airspeed 
(KIAS) 
Observations 
4 static lines 
below the 
sponson 
40 
The static lines were reeled out one by one. A group of 2 lines made a 
circle of 2 m in diam. A bundle of 3 and 4 lines flied calmly, remaining 
together. With slip ball ½ to the left, the bags stabilised at 1 m outside 
of the sponson and 1.5 m below it. 
50 The bags oscillated vertically, contacting the sponson occasionally. 
60 80 
At 60 KIAS the oscillation was reduced. By increased airspeed the bags 
started rising towards the sponson, making a slight contact with it. 
80 
With slip ball 2/3 to the right, the bags rose to the junction of the 
sponson and the fuselage. 
4 static lines 
above the 
sponson 
40 80 The same observations as with one static line, see Table 1. 
 
 
Table 3. Test results for PASI-2 (long, floor mounting) with one or four static lines 
Test case 
Airspeed 
(KIAS) 
Observations 
One static line 
below the 
sponson 
40 
The circling amplitude of the bag was greater than with PASI-1: the 
diameter was vertically 4 5 m (estimated).   
60 Circling diminished with airspeed, being 1 m in diameter at 60 KIAS. 
80 
The D-bag circled at 0.5 m diameter and could be seen above the 
sponson. 
One static line 
above the 
sponson 
40 
The D-bag reached beyond the sponson longitudinally and flew at the 
intersection of the sponson and the fuselage.  
80 
With increased airspeed the flapping amplitude increased and the D-
bag started pounding the fuselage. At 80 KIAS the sideways amplitude 
of flapping was 0.5 m. 
4 static lines 
below the 
sponson 
40 
Four SLs were reeled below the sponson. The bags circled with a large 
diameter as a bundle. 
60 
With increased airspeed the bundle rose up and aligned with the 
fuselage. At 60 KIAS the D-bag bundle could be seen above the 
sponson. 
80 The bundle made a slow circle with a diameter of 0.5 m. 
4 static lines 
above the 
sponson 
N/A 
Not tested as the static lines’ behaviour with PASI-1 was generally 
better at the previous test points > Testing with PASI-2 was 
discontinued. 
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Table 4. Test results for the NHI anchor line (ceiling mounting) 
Test case 
Airspeed 
(KIAS) 
Observations 
One static line 
below the spon-
son 
40 80 The behaviour and positioning was similar than with PASI-2. 
One static line 
above the spon-
son 
40 80 
The line had a tendency to rise along the deflector bar. This was 
controlled manually so that the SL did not rise above the lower edge of 
CFD. At 70 KIAS the D-bag reached up to the aft cabin window and 
swung vertically ± 1m about the window’s lower frame.  
The D-bag was reeled in at 40 KIAS and it dragged along the top 
surface of the sponson, getting briefly stuck somewhere. When passing 
the CFD, it started circling violently, as with previous times. 
One static line at 
door upper edge 
level (vertically) 
40 60 
When reeling out the SL it was observed that a side slip affected the SL 
very strongly. With ½ slip ball to the left, the D-bag suddenly swung 
upwards towards the engine cowlings and the main rotor. The out-
reeling and testing was discontinued as unsafe. Thus the effect of 
side slip for the max length of static line was not tested. 
It was also concluded that reeling in the D-bag from its full length at 
door upper frame level would not be safe.  
 
On the next flight (test #3) this was re tested: a single static line was 
secured so (shortened) that it could in no case reach the main rotor. 
When reeling out the SL, the D-bag occasionally made a circle 
hitting the ASF’s lower part (video archived in UTJR flight test office). 
This, in combination with the previous observation in sideslip, was 
considered unacceptable. Furthermore, the ASF has plastic air 
scoops, which would probably have been damaged in repeated 
operations. After this the testing with NHI’s anchor line was 
discontinued. No benefit was foreseen from its usage, but the static 
line behaviour became unpredictable and the risks were elevated 
compared to the floor attachment. 
4 static lines 
below the spon-
son 
N/A Not tested due to a single static line’s unacceptable behaviour. 
4 static lines 
above the spon-
son 
N/A Not tested due to a single static line’s unacceptable behaviour. 
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During one of the static line retractions at 80 KIAS, the D-bag got stuck to the engine #2’s 
start fuel drain pipe in the right MLG wheel bay. The drain pipe bent forward approximately 
15°. This very minor incident was reported to the NHI with Service Request SR 1-7914270. 
As a solution it was concluded that if the D-bags got stuck during retraction, the JM should 
give some slack and try again. The fluttering movement would most probably guide the D-
bag via another route and prevent bending of the drain pipe. Since this first occurrence, no 
entanglements occurred.  
As a conclusion of the test item number 2, the testing with NHI’s anchor line was 
discontinued as potentially unsafe and because it did not provide any benefits for the T-10 
system usage compared to the floor mounted anchor line. The PASI-2 anchor line was also 
rejected as it did not provide any benefits compared to PASI-1 and increased the unrest of the 
static lines in slipstream. The behaviour of the static lines was satisfactory with the PASI-1 
anchor and the testing was continued with it. The airspeed regime was limited to 50 80 KIAS 
( 90 150 km/h). Any lower airspeed increased the static lines instability. Low airspeeds were 
not desirable for the jumpers due to longer parachute opening times, increasing risks for a 
given exit height. 
4.2.3. Test #3: Dummy drops 
A total of 16 dummy drops were made during a single sortie consisting of four loads, i.e. four 
take-offs and landings. For test details, see Appendix 6 (Table 11, item #3) and master test 
matrix test points #3 and #4 in Appendix 9. The first eight dummy drops were made one by 
one, reeling the SL in after each drop. The airspeeds were 50, 60, 70 and 80 KIAS and the 
altitude 3000ft AGL. Two drops were made from each of the airspeeds. The last eight drops 
were made in sticks of four dummies, airspeeds being 60 and 80 KIAS and the drop altitude 
1000 ft AGL. 
Working with the 100 kg dummies was quite hard in the cabin of only 158 cm ceiling height 
even for two jumpmasters. Possibly due to this, the second dummy hit the cabin boarding 
step, causing a 30x50mm dent and buckling of the step’s longitudinal outer frame (Service 
Request reference: SR 1-7914270). This was however a minor incident and purely test setup 
related. All the dummies behaved in a stable manner after exit. The minimum separation with 
the right sponson during exits was 20 cm. All the static lines stabilised below the sponson and 
behaved well as on the previous sortie with PASI-1 anchor line. 
As a conclusion, the test item was successfully passed and the campaign continued with 
paratroopers, maintaining the test airspeed range of 50 80 KIAS. 
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4.2.4. Test #4: Paratrooper jumps 
A total of 28 paratrooper jumps were made on one sortie consisting of three loads. For sortie 
details, see Appendix 6 (Table 11, item #4) and the master test matrix test points #7 and #8 in 
Appendix 9. The cabin loading with a total of 13 cabin occupants, parachutes on is illustrated 
with Figure 23 as an example.  
The first four jumps were made individually from a seated position and only one jumper 
connected to the anchor line at a time in accordance with the incremental approach principle 
and the risk mitigation. The seated exit position reduced variables and made it more probable 
that the static lines would safely stabilise under the sponson instead of above it. In the seated 
exit position the jumper was sitting in the left (forward) side of the cabin door edge, facing 
directly to the side, feet hanging outside the cabin boarding step and hands beside thighs 
(Figure 24, step 1). The subsequent jumps were made from a standing position from the left 
side of the door, with left foot on the door edge and left hand taking support of the left door 
frame (Figure 25). The first ten jumps were made individually, one per jump run (Table 5, test 
points 1 10) and with only one jumper connected to the anchor line at a time. The subsequent 
jumps were made in sticks of two or four jumpers (Table 5, test points 11 15). Figure 26 
visualises the exit procedure.  
The parachuting drop light (PDL, Figure 8) was used from the cockpit as per its design and 
purpose, but for information only. The jump orders were given via the intercom. 
The test points and the observations for the three loads are listed in Table 5. 
 
Figure 23. The loading of 13 cabin occupants including: 9 jumpers, 2 jumpmasters, 
an FTE and the loadmaster (behind the camera). Situation forward of the cabin 
door is seen on the left aft of the cabin door on the right 
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Table 5. Test points and observations for the paratrooper jumps (test item #4) 
Test 
point # 
# of load 
Airspeed 
(KIAS) 
Number of 
jumpers 
Method of 
exit 
Observations 
1 
1 
50 1 sitting OK 
2 60 1 sitting OK. See Figure 24 
3 70 1 sitting OK 
4 80 1 sitting OK 
5 50 1 standing OK. See Figure 25 
6 60 1 standing OK 
7 65 1 standing OK. 
8 80 1 
standing OK. Static line contacted the front edge of 
the sponson. 
9 80 1 standing OK. 
10 
2 
60 1 standing OK. 
11 70 4 
standing OK. H/C climbed briefly at +100 fpm (ALT 
hold on) 
12 80 4 standing OK 
13 
3 
60 2 standing OK 
14 50 4 
standing OK. One static line stabilized against the  
right POS light > no issues with retraction 
of static lines. 
15 60 4 standing See Figure 26 
 
 
 
 
Figure 24. A jumper’s exit at 60 KIAS from a seated position. In the readiness posi-
tion (step 1) the jumper was sitting on the cabin floor facing directly to the side. 
The feet were hanging outside and hands beside thighs on the door edge. After 
exit the static line first contacted the middle of the boarding step, then stabilised 
against the bar between the step and the sponson as seen in step #6 on the bot-
tom right 
1 2 3 
4 5 6 
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Figure 25. A jumper’s exit at 50 KIAS from a standing position. In the readiness po-
sition (step 1) the jumper was standing on the left side of the door left foot for-
ward. After jump the static line stabilised against the bar between the step and the 
sponson, contacting also the deflector bar 
 
 
Figure 26. A stick of four jumpers exit at 60 KIAS from a standing position. The top-
left picture shows the crowded readiness position. The series from top-middle to 
bottom-right (steps 2 6) shows the exit of the last jumper of the stick and how the 
four static lines stabilise below the sponson, contacting also the deflector bar 
 
1 2 3 
4 5 
6 
1 2 3 
4 5 6 
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Figure 27. Retraction of four static lines by jumpmaster #1 at 60 KIAS 
In addition to what is noted in Table 5, the following observations were made (collected from 
the Post Flight Report 6/2012 [3]: 
 All the planned jumps could be made fluently and in a controlled manner. The jump-
ers did not report anything that would restrict the normal paratrooper exit procedure. 
The jumpers were aware of the sponson behind the door, but at these airspeeds (50 80 
knots) it did not create a need for any specific exit technique. It was also reported that 
the NH90 did not induce a non-conventional or adverse slipstream that would have af-
fected the exits. 
 The MC1-1C static lines had slightly larger snap hooks than those of the T-10Bs (see 
Appendix 4’s Figure 31). Connecting and disconnecting the MC1-1C snap hooks to 
the PASI-1’s angled D-ring (Capewell 101406, NPF 61A665) was awkward and slow 
for the jumpmaster. For the T-10Bs this was not a problem due to smaller snap hooks. 
 With four jumper sticks the exit positioning was somewhat tight, making it difficult 
but possible for the JM2 to inspect the gear of the last jumper. This was already indi-
cated by the ground tests. In spite of this, the jumpmasters commented that it would be 
feasible to conduct T-10 operations from the NH90 with one jumpmaster only. That 
would also provide more room for the jumpers in the cabin.  
 The cabin occupants reported that from the cabin space point of view it was not neces-
sary to turn the loadmaster’s seat against the wall (as all the other seats) from its nor-
mal position, which is facing forward. 
 The ICS leads and harness attachment straps got easily entangled with each other. The 
LMs and the JMs required an ICS extension lead, which should be connected to the 
MSUs behind the door line. The MSUs are preferred for the LM and JMs to hear the 
external radio traffic (not possible via the SSUs). The LM shall in any case be con-
nected to the MSU3’s hardwired back-up connector in case of an ICS malfunction. 
1 2 3 
4 5 6 
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 The 44 drops made during the test items #3 and #4 abraded one layer of duct tape part-
ly away from the boarding step. The static lines’ contact points are seen in Figure 24’s 
steps 5 and 6. The static lines also slightly abraded the sponson’s and boarding step’s 
paint which was acceptable. No observable abrasion of the static lines was noted.  
 At these airspeeds the occasional contact between the static lines and the right position 
light was very benign. This did not raise any concerns as of the position lights integri-
ty during T-10 parachuting operations. 
 Retraction of the static lines was straightforward and easy for the jumpmaster. The 
procedure is illustrated in Figure 27. 
 The Parachuting Drop Light “jump” tone with green light was not audible inside the 
cabin in flight. 
 No testing with weapons or rucksacks was made due to time constraints. 
 The right side Chaff and Flare Dispenser is located so that if operated during parachut-
ing operations, it would endanger the exiting jumpers. 
The static lines’ good behaviour was substantiated already during the dummy drops (Chapter 
4.2.3). However, as the static lines’ dynamic behaviour was the main unknown during the test 
planning, a limited comparison between the analytical predictions and the actual flight test 
observations was made. These results can potentially be utilised in future planning of similar 
tests. The static line’s dynamic behaviour during and after parachutist separation is discussed 
in Appendix 11. 
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5. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
As a conclusion, parachuting from the NH90 right cabin door at 50 80 KIAS using the T-
10B/MC1-1C static line parachute systems was easy for the paratroopers, safe for the 
helicopter and readily controllable for the jumpmasters. With the used setup, the dynamic 
behaviour of the T-10 static lines was predictable and uneventful. The NH90 TTH TFIA 
helicopter equipped with the deflector bar, Patria’s floor protection panels, PASI-1 anchor 
line and tape protection at the right cabin door edge was found suitable for T-10 static line 
parachuting operations within the scope of the test (Chapter 1.1).  
For the configuration mentioned in the paragraph above, the following aircraft related 
operating limitations are proposed by the test team:  
1. Allowed exit airspeed range: 50 80 KIAS; 
2. Maximum jumper weight: 150 kg; 
3. Landing gear shall be retracted during jumping; 
4. The right search light shall be retracted during jumping; 
5. With rucksacks the last group of four jumpers to exit shall not sit in the last two rows 
of seats in the cabin; 
6. With rucksacks only two jumpers shall be sitting or standing at the cabin door edge at 
the same time; 
7. Parachuting is not allowed with static lines connected to the ceiling anchor cables. 
The first limitation is based on the observed static line behaviour in slipstream (Chapter 
4.2.2). The second is based on the maximum design load used to dimension the parachuting 
kit and the PASI-anchor (Chapter 2.4). The third and fourth limitations are based on the risk 
analysis to avoid the static line entanglement and damage to H/C (Appendix 10). The fifth and 
the sixth limitation are deducted from centre-of-gravity calculations (Appendix 8). The last 
limitation comes from the test results (Chapter 4.2.2). 
The test team’s recommendation for the exit airspeed is 65 KIAS (120 km/h) as the best 
compromise between the parachute opening speed and the static lines’ behaviour. The 
recommended exit method is to leap out from the left (nose) side of the right cabin door to 
minimise risks for contact with the sponson. 
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The Prototype Anchor for Static line Implementation, version 1 (PASI-1) installed in 
accordance with Figure 11 and Appendix 4’s Figure 34 was found suitable for its intended 
purpose. However, the small size of the snap hook attachment ring should be rectified by 
changing bigger D-rings to PASI-1 instead of Ring D, angled (Capewell 101406, NPF 
61A665). The load bearing capability of the new D rings shall be at least 5000 lbs and the 
total functional length of the PASI-1 shall not change. 
The used method of taping the door edge with a combination of aluminium and duct tape was 
found as a suitable mean to protect the static lines from excessive abrasion. This kind of 
method was also instructed in [32, p. 17-9]. This was finally the only tape protection 
considered necessary for routine static line operations with the Finnish variant NH90. 
The fit of the parachuting system’s deflector bar’s two middle attachment points were 
excessively tight, possibly due to paint layers. It was considered questionable whether the 
attachment points’ integrity would endure repeated removals and installations with a standard 
200g maintenance hammer. Until this issue has been rectified, the number of removals and 
installations of the bar should obviously be kept to the minimum. 
No specific recommendation concerning the seating configuration was made. The only 
important point was to leave the right cabin door area clear, which was self-evident and can 
only be realised with a maximum of 15 installed troop seats (in the Finnish configuration). 
By the test team’s judgment the occasional contact of the static lines with the right position 
light was so benign that it did not cause any real structural risk for the integrity of the position 
light. Thus no further actions concerning this are foreseen when using the PASI-1 anchor. 
The effect of atmospheric turbulence was considered not a factor from the safety point of 
view. In any case the wind limitation of 7 m/s for static line parachuting training prevent any 
significant turbulence at the jump altitudes. 
It was concluded that if the D-bags got stuck during retraction (for example to the start fuel 
drain pipe), the JM should give some slack and try again. The fluttering movement would 
most probably guide the D-bag via another route and prevent bending of the drain pipe.  
The Parachuting Drop Light (PDL) was not necessary for static line operations at least during 
day time, as the relevant information between cockpit and cabin could be conveniently 
transferred by ICS and hand signals. The operation logic of PDL’s audio tone is in 
contradiction with other FDF aircraft, but as the audio tone was not audible in flight, this did 
not have a significant effect. 
       39  
 
Even though the need to use chaff and flares for self-protection during parachuting operations 
is unlikely, it needs to be instructed that the use of Chaff and Flare Dispenser is not possible 
from the right side during jumping. 
The risk analysis and mitigation actions predicted well the actual outcome. Especially the 
introduction of the floor attached anchor line proved to be a good decision for testing and 
operation with the T-10 system. With another parachute system with much shorter static lines 
the use of the NHI’s ceiling mounted anchor lines could be possible. However, with the T-10 
system the use of the ceiling mounted anchor lines was considered unsafe. 
T-10 parachuting operations with personal weapons or rucksacks were not tested due to time 
constraints. The use of the NH90 helicopter with the T-10 parachuting system in combination 
with personal weapons and rucksacks as well as material dropping should be investigated. 
Also the use of other types of parachutes than the T-10 should be tested. Discussions with the 
authority are required to define what kind of substantiation is needed for operational release. 
The use of the NH90’s rear ramp for static line operations should be investigated as soon as 
the complete removal-installation instructions for the rear ramp and hatch are available. This 
could potentially enable using greater exit airspeeds and make moving in the cabin and 
material dropping easier than with the right cabin door exit solution. 
The NHI’ calculated estimations of the static lines’ behaviour seemed to predict well the real 
characteristics in flight for airspeed range of 50 to 80 knots, as detailed in Appendix 11. 
However, the calculations could not predict all the details of the static lines dynamics, such as 
the trim position high amplitude rotation at 40 knots and the flutter in trim position at all 
airspeeds. Only the “Start” and “Trim” positions could be verified, as the “Max” or highest 
up-swing position was in limited by the sponson in the test setup. Due to different initial 
conditions in the calculation and the actual test, some assumptions had to be made. These are 
detailed in Appendix 11. 
As a final conclusion the test team considered the NH90, equipped as mentioned above, to 
meet both the user and the authority requirements (see Chapter 3) concerning the T-10 static 
line parachuting operations. However, the official approval process needs to address and 
decide on the completeness of the presented substantiation before the capability is released to 
service. 
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6. SUMMARY 
This study summarises the analyses and tests conducted to introduce the T-10 static line 
parachuting capability to the Finnish Defence Forces’ NH90 helicopter. The main research 
question “By which procedures and limitations can the NH90 helicopter be used for static line 
parachutist training with T-10B/MC1-1C parachutes?” can now be answered. By flight 
testing, supported by analysis and literary study it is shown that the NH90 can safely be used 
for static line parachuting training with T-10B/MC1-1C equipment, taking into account the 
scope mentioned in Chapter 1.1 and the procedures and limitations presented in Chapter 5. 
Most importantly, the static lines anchor point should be on the cabin floor level and the 
airspeed range 50–80 knots for safe parachuting operations from the right cabin door. 
The first sub question: “What are the NH90 helicopter and the T-10B/MC1-1C parachute 
systems?” is answered in Chapter 2. The chapter also describes the modifications for the 
helicopter and the manufacturer’s Parachuting Kit to enable safe and controlled conduct of 
operations.  
The second sub question: “What are the relevant user and authority requirements for the 
NH90 static line parachuting system and capability?” is answered in Chapter 3. User 
requirements are defined by the end user Utti Jaeger Regiment. Airworthiness aspects are 
governed by the Finnish Military Aviation Authority via regulations and advisories, of which 
the relevant items are presented in Chapter 3.  
The third sub question: “How does the static line parachuting system, as incorporated in the 
NH90 helicopter, behave during flight tests and what are the possible areas requiring further 
development?” is answered in Chapter 4.2. In short, the NHI’s standard Parachuting Kit’s 
cabin ceiling mounted guidance cables were considered as unsafe anchor lines for the T-10 
system. This was due to the ceiling attached static lines’ unacceptable behaviour in slipstream. 
However, the floor mounted PASI prototype anchor line was a usable solution for the T-10 
static line operations. In the flight test setup the only items requiring modification were the 
PASI-1 prototype anchor’s D-rings for static lines’ attachment. The D-rings needed to be 
changed to larger ones to facilitate use of the MC1-1C snap hooks. 
Some proposals for future testing are presented in Chapter 5. One of the most important 
points is the usability of the rear ramp for parachuting operations, with the ramp and hatch 
removed.  
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APPENDIX 1 
 
TERMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
 
@ “at” 
# “number” 
°C Degrees Celsius 
A/C Aircraft 
AGL Above Ground Level 
Aircraft A machine that is able to fly by gaining support from the 
air. [35] The word aircraft can mean for example a fixed 
wing aeroplane, a helicopter or a hot air balloon. 
ALT (hold) An autopilot mode for automatic barometric flight altitude 
hold. 
AM Asennusmääräys (“Installation order” for temporary 
solutions) 
ASF Anti-sand filter (of the engine air intake) 
ATT Attitude hold based flight control mode of the NH90 Flight 
Control system 
Authority In this case the Finnish Military Aviation Authority 
(FIMAA), a military aviation regulatory unit associated 
with the Air Force Headquarters [1].  
CFD Chaff and Flare Dispenser or Computational fluid 
dynamics 
CGx Longitudinal centre of gravity 
CGy Lateral centre of gravity 
Conscript A person undergoing his/her compulsory national military 
service 
CoG Centre of Gravity 
CoS Coefficient of Safety, number given by break-up or limit 
load divided by the maximum applied load (the design 
load) 
CP Control Panel 
D-bag Deployment bag 
e.g. For example (in Latin: “exemplī grātiā”) 
EDA European Defence Agency 
Exit weight The all-up-weight of the jumper including all personal 
equipment and the parachute assembly 
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F_AL Force on the anchor line 
F_RING Force on the floor attachment ring 
F_SL Force on the static line 
FAA Federal Aviation Administration 
FAR-29 Federal Aviation Regulation, part 29 (for transport 
category rotorcraft) 
FDF Finnish Defence Forces 
FIMAA Finnish Military Aviation Authority 
FINAF Finnish Air Force 
FINAF AMC Finnish Air Force Air Materiel Command 
FM Field Manual (US) or Flight Manual 
FOC Final Operational Configuration 
ft Foot/feet, 1 ft = 0.3048m 
FTE Flight Test Engineer 
FWD Forward 
H/C helicopter 
HD High Definition 
hPa Hecto-Pascals, 1 hPa = 100 Pascals or 0.001 bars 
IAS Indicated airspeed (seen on cockpit instruments) 
ICS Intercom system 
ID Identification (number/code) 
IETP Interactive Electronic Technical Publication 
in Inch = 2.54 cm 
IOC+ Improved Operational Configuration 
IR Infra-red 
JM Jumpmaster 
KIAS Indicated airspeed in knots 
kN Kilo-Newton = 1000 Newtons 
kt (or kts) Knot(s), 1 knot = 1.852 km/h 
kW kilo-Watt 
lb (or lbs) Pounds, 1 lb = 0.4536 kg 
LG Landing Gear 
LH Left hand side 
LLOS Laatu- ja lentokelpoisuusosasto / Quality and 
Airworthiness Division of the FINAF AMC 
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LM Loadmaster 
local Local time, in this case the Finnish summer time, UTC+3, 
unless otherwise indicated 
MAUW Max All-up weight 
mi Statute mile(s). 1 mi = 1.609 km 
MLG Main Landing Gear 
MOD Ministry of Defence 
mph Miles per hour. 1 mph = 1.609 km/h 
MPKK Maanpuolustuskorkeakoulu 
MR Main rotor (of a helicopter) 
MSU Master Station Unit, control box of the NH90 intercom 
system 
NAHEMA Nato Helicopter Management Agency 
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
NDU National Defence University 
NHI NHIndustries, NH90 supplier 
NH90 “Nato Helicopter for the 90s” 
OAT Outside Air Temperature 
OHCP Overhead control panel (in the NH90 cockpit) 
P/N Part Number 
Paratrooper A soldier who is trained to enter combat zones by 
parachuting from aircraft [37] 
PASI Prototype Anchor for Static line Implementation (designed 
and manufactured by UTJR) 
PDL Parachuting Drop Light 
PFR Post Flight Report 
PI/P Product Investment / Production 
POS Position 
QNH Pressure setting for altitude above mean sea level 
RBL Requirement of Type Specification 
RFQ Request for Quotation 
RH Right hand (side) 
RWR Radar Warning Receiver 
SCT Scattered clouds, 4/8 of the sky or less 
SL Static Line 
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Slipstream The region of airflow close to the helicopter’s fuselage 
affected by its movement or rotor’s wake 
Sponson (for the NH90) A projection from the side of the fuselage, 
housing primarily the main landing gear 
SR Service Request (to the NHI support organisation) 
SSOC Senior Staff Officer Course 
SSU Secondary Station Unit, the passengers interface to the 
NH90’s intercom system 
Stick A group of paratroopers to exit with short intervals on the 
same jump run 
SX16 A powerful external search light 
T-10 / MC1 Round troop military parachute. MC1 is the steerable 
version of the T-10 
TBC To Be Confirmed (later) 
TFIA Transport Finnish Army (an NH90 TTH variant) 
TMT “Lentoteknillinen muutos- ja tiedotusjärjestelmä” - FDF’s 
airborne systems related technical change and information 
data system 
TN Technical Note 
TOW Take-off weight 
TPSA Requirement of Type Specification 
TS Type Specification 
TTH Tactical Transport Helicopter 
UH Utility Helicopter 
US United States (of America) 
UTJR Utti Jaeger Regiment 
VFR Visual Flight Rules 
Vis Visibility 
VM Verification Method 
WTR Winch Man Trim 
XTP Experimental Test Pilot 
YT-ohje Yhteistoimintaohje, a procedure for co-operation (here 
between the aircrew and the parachutists) 
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EXTRACT FORM THE NH90 ACQUISITION CONTRACT 
 
 
Figure 28. Extract from the FDF NH90 acquisition contract’s Appendix 2 [33]: re-
quirements RBL-925 and RBL-926 relating to the parachuting capability. Contrac-
tual Verification Method 9 means that the qualification for the Finnish NH90 vari-
ant (TFIA) is based on an already existing qualification. In this case the NAHEMA 
qualification for the TTH. The verification method “9” is specified in brackets with 
numbers that have the following explanations: 1 = Design documents, 3c = 
Demonstration on material – Moc-ups, 4 = Flight tests, 7 = Documentation for air-
crew (Flight Manual etc). Together the requirement RBL-926 and MOC4 as the 
verification method indicate that flight testing is required for the contractual sub-
stantiation of the requirement (and the capability) 
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EXTRACT FROM THE NH90 SECURITY CLASSIFICATION GUIDE 
 
Below are two extracts (see Figure 29 and Figure 30) of the NH90 program’s Security 
Classification Guide [28], which is attachment 1 for the annex K (unclassified) of the NH90 
PI/P Contract (NH90 acquisition contract) between the NAHEMA and the NHI.  
 
 
Figure 29. Extract from page 1/12, clarifying the classification abbreviations 
 
 
Figure 30. Extract from page 6/12 showing that the parachuting system is classified 
as “NU” = NATO Unclassified which is the lowest classification possible and in 
this case corresponds to “JULKINEN” in Finland 
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TECHNICAL DETAILS OF THE TEST ITEMS 
 
Table 6. T-10B / MC1-1C main characteristics [7; 8]  
Parameter Value 
Diameter 35 feet (10.7 m) nominal, 25.7 feet (7.8 m) inflated 
Gore (canopy) material T-10B: 1.1 oz. PIA-C-7020, type I ripstop nylon parachute cloth 
MC1-1C: 1.12 oz PIA-C-44378, F-111 ripstop parachute nylon 
Number of suspension lines 30 
Suspension line material Type II nylon cord, PIA-C-5040, 400 lb (181.8 kg) tensile strength 
Length of suspension line T-10B: 7.8m / MC1-1C: 6.7m connector to lower lateral band 
Maximum Weight Capacity 163 kg (360 lbs) 
Complete assembly weight 14 kg (31 lbs) 
Maximum jump wind speed 14 knots (7 m/s),  in Finland, [34] 
Descent rate T-10B: Avg 6.7 m/s (22 ft/sec), MC1-1C: avg. 5.5 m/s (18 ft/sec) 
Minimum deployment altitude 500 ft (152 m) 
Maximum deployment speed 150 knots (278 km/h) 
Service life 16.5 years (in Finland, [34]) 
 
Table 7. T-10 main components’ part numbers  [7; 8; 34]  
T-10B (P/N: 11-1-564-1) MC1-1C (P/N: 11-1-900-2) 
Canopy 11-1-1501-1 Canopy 11-1-1501-3 
Pack 62J434 Pack 62J4342 
D-bag 56D6276 D-bag (the same as for T-10B) 
Static line 56D6481 Static line 55D6481 
Harness 11-1-2143-1 Harness (the same as for T-10B) 
Riser 11-1-2149-2 Riser (the same as for T-10B) 
      
    
 
Figure 31. The snap hooks used during the tests. On the left the T-10B snap hook 
(P/N: MS 70120, proof load 1750 lbs/794 kg/7.8 kN) and on the right the MC1-1C 
snap hook (P/N: 11-1-6991-1, 100% proof load 1750 lbs/794 kg/7.8 kN, tensile 
strength 8000 lbs/3600 kg/35.6kN) [25, p. 3-21]. The 11-1-6991-1 snap hook is 
generally simpler to use as it does not need a safety pin, unlike the earlier MS 
70120 snap hook. However, the construction makes the 11-1-6991-1 slightly larg-
er in dimensions. 
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Table 8. NH90 general characteristics and performance values ([36] unless noted 
otherwise) 
Crew minimum 1 pilot + 1 crew member, normally 2 pilots + 1 
loadmaster [20] 
Capacity 16 seated troops or 12 medevac stretchers or 2 NATO pal-
lets or approximately 3000 kg internal or external load. 
Length 16.13 m (52 ft 11 in) 
Rotor diameter 16.30 m (53 ft 6 in) 
Height 5.23 m (17 ft 2 in), nominal cabin height 1.58 m (5 ft 2 in) 
max take-off weight 11000 kg (24250 lb) [20] 
Powerplant 2 × Rolls-Royce Turbomeca RTM322-01/9 turboshaft, ap-
prox 1400 kW ( 1900 shp) each at max continuous power 
Maximum speed (cruise) 300 km/h (162 knots, 186 mph) 
Range (with internal fuel) 800 km, 497 mi 
Service ceiling 6000 m (20000 ft) 
Rate of climb (max weight, sea level) 8 m/s (1574 ft/m) 
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Figure 32. The NH90 TTH three view diagram: principal dimensions in millimetres. 
The cabin doorway on both sides is 1.6 metres wide and 1.5 metres high [19]  
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Figure 33. The location of the Cable Kit: Anchor cable, support brackets and op-
tional rubber stops mounted on interface brackets [Ref 1] 
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Table 9. NH90 Parachuting System part numbers and weights [14]. As an excep-
tion to the convention of the study, here commas are used as the decimal separa-
tors instead of dots. 
 
 
Table 10. Prototype anchor line components [25; 26] 
Item / name P/N 
Strength 
(lbs) 
Strength 
(kg) 
Purpose Notes 
Quick Release 
Cargo Ring (dou-
ble stub ring, for 
Douglas type 
rails) 
47981-10 
NSN: 5340-
01-560-3313 
5000 2268 
Attachment of the 
anchor line to floor 
MFG: ANCRA INTER-
NATIONAL LLC 
Snap, parachute 
chest type pack 
MS70121-1 5000 2268 
Connection to cargo 
rings 
 
Type-7 webbing 
(”belt”) 
Ty-8, PIA-W-
4088 
6000 2722 Anchor line webbing 
1 23/32” width (44 mm). 
Commonly used in para-
chute harnesses 
Ring, D angled 
Capewell 
101406, NPF 
61A665 
5000 2268 
attachment of the 
static line to anchor 
line 
Optionally used instead 
of Ring, D (as in Figure 
12) 
Ring, D 11-1-485 5000 2268 
attachment of the 
static line to anchor 
line 
T-10B/MC1-1C harness 
assembly component 
Optionally used instead 
of Ring, D angled 
Harness thread  
> 6000 
lbs 
> 2760 
kg 
Attachment of the 
components by sew-
ing 
The tensile strength of a 
single thread is 12 kg 
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Figure 34. Strength and dimensioning calculations of the “PASI”-belt’s attachment 
to the cabin floor. Load on the SL = load on PASI = load on the floor attachment 
point = 11.76kN in the worst (design) case. The PASI belt has the minimum ten-
sile strength of 22.3 kN, which provides a CoS of at least 1.9 against the design 
load. Floor drawing is from [5] 
 
  1 
APPENDIX 5 
 
FINAF AMC’S INSTALLATION ORDERS FOR FLIGHT TESTS   
 
 
Figure 35. Installation order “AM/132/NH” for PASI and test related modifications 
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Figure 36. Installation order “AM/133/NH” for the use of the rescue parachutes 
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Figure 37. Installation order “AM/109/YL” for the Cabin Safety Harness. 
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GENERAL TEST CONDITIONS 
 
Table 11. General test conditions for each sortie 
Test 
# 
Date 
(2012) 
A/C 
(NH) 
Config &  
Equipment 
Weight&CoG 
Fuel 
(take-
off, 
kg) 
QNH 
/ OAT 
/ Wind 
/ Visibility 
/ Clouds, 
WX 
Landing 
/Flight 
Time 
(hh:mm, 
local) 
Other 
1 17.9. 209 
Ground test. An-
chor lines PASI-1 
& 2 and NHI 
N/A N/A N/A N/A  
2 18.9. 209 
LG UP, ASF, no 
IR suppressor, RH 
cabin door open, 
PASI-1, -2, and 
NHI 
TOW: 9400 kg 
CGx:7.06 m 
CGy: 0.02 m 
1700 
1011 hPa 
/ +11°C, 
/ 190°,5kt, 
/ 16 km 
/ few 300ft   
11:16  
/ 1:57 
40 KIAS: 
pitch +8° 
80 KIAS: 
pitch +2° 
3 20.9. 209 
LG UP, ASF, no 
IR suppressor, RH 
cabin door open, 
PASI-1 
TOW: 9600 kg 
CoG within FM 
limits 
1500 
1011 hPa 
/ +13° 
/ 200°, 8kt 
/ vis 50 km 
/ SCT 
3500ft 
11:45 
/ 1:36 
4 loads 
with 4 
dummies 
each = 16 
dummy 
drops total 
4 20.9. 209 
LG UP, ASF, no 
IR suppressor, RH 
cabin door open, 
PASI-1 
TOW:10100kg 
CGx:7.05 m 
CGy: 0.02 m 
1500 
1011 hPa 
/ +13° 
/ 200°, 8kt 
/ vis 50 km 
/ SCT 
3500ft 
15:47 
/ 0:54 
3 loads, 
9+9+10 
jumpers = 
28 jumps 
 
Table 12. Part numbers for some test relevant aircraft items 
Troop seat P/N: S252M20A1005 [12, p. 4] 
Floor protection panels (Patria) P/N: PNH252300010 [5, p. 2] 
Boarding step (group) P/N: S533M0060051 [23, p. 9] 
 
Table 13. The essential anthropometric data of the test personnel (without any 
equipment) 
Role Height (cm) Weight (kg) 
Jumpmaster 1 173 75 
Jumpmaster 2 180 90 
Loadmaster 170 75 
The tallest paratrooper 196 90 
The shortest paratrooper 175 70 
Paratrooper average  180 75 
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TEST LIMITATIONS 
 
The reason for each limitation is clarified in brackets. 
1. Absolute weather minima for flight testing: visibility 3km / cloud base 500ft AGL 
(FDF’s NH90 maintenance flight test guide, [9]); 
2. The maximum airspeed for static line jumping:  
o 80 KIAS for floor attachment (due to design assumptions [15]); 
o 60 KIAS for ceiling anchor cable attachment (due to analysis results [10]). 
3. The minimum airspeed for static line jumping: 40 KIAS (own judgment, less risk for 
SL bounce up, [2]); 
4. Maximum ground wind speed for dropping parachutists: 14 knots (FDF regulations. 
Also test recommendation for dummy drops); 
5. Maximum equipped jumper’s all-up-weight: 150 kg (design assumption [15]); 
6. Minimum drop altitude for parachutists: 1500 ft AGL [32]; 
7. Minimum drop altitude for test dummies: 300 ft AGL (own judgment  adequate 
ground clearance for T-10 opening); 
8. Landing gear shall be retracted (up) during static line jumping (less risk for SL entan-
glement); 
9. Intentional quick stop, autorotation and hovering manoeuvres at an airspeed less than 
30 KIAS are prohibited with static lines out on the door (own judgment, risk for SL 
vs. rotor contact); 
10. The right search light shall be retracted during jumping activity (risk for SL entangle-
ment); 
11. Turbulence at the exit altitude shall be low (NHI draft test plan limitation); 
12. No sideslip when dropping dummies or parachutists (less risk for adverse static line 
behaviour); 
13. With rucksacks the last four jumpers to exit shall not sit in the last two rows of seats in 
the cabin (CoG calculations, longitudinal aft limit); 
14. With rucksacks only two jumpers shall be sitting or standing at the cabin door edge at 
the same time (CoG calculations, lateral limit); 
15. The maximum allowed vertical position for the static line during jumping (up-swing) 
is the top of the helicopter tail boom (own judgment for safe margin vs. MR). 
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MASS AND BALANCE CALCULATIONS  
 
Some example results are given below presuming 1700 kg of fuel and all occupants weighing 
100 kg (a realistic average value for parachutists without rucksacks). In the following figures, 
the precise NH90 centre-of-gravity envelopes or CoG limits (longitudinal and lateral) have 
been omitted due to classification reasons. 
 The max loading is 12 jumpers (@ 100 kg), two jumpmasters and a four man crew 
(Figure 38); 
 The aft CoG limit is nearly reached (but not yet crossed) with 1700 kg fuel, if the first 
three cabin seat rows (six seats) are empty and the remaining seats occupied (Figure 
39); 
 It is ok to have four jumpers at the most aft four seats and two jumpmasters inspecting 
them (with loadmaster at the cabin door); 
 With one occupant on the left side of the cabin (JM), two on the right (LM+JM)  and 
four sitting in the right cabin door, the lateral CoG is well within limits (Figure 40). 
Reducing the amount of fuel provides more marginal to these cases. As a summary, if all 
occupants weigh on the average 100 kg, there is no practical case where the MAUW and CoG 
limits would be exceeded during these tests. 
Below are some similarly calculated example values presuming 1800 kg of fuel, aircrew and 
jumpmasters weighing 100 kg and jumpers weighing 150 kg (with rucksacks): 
 The max loading is 8 jumpers (@ 150 kg), two jumpmasters and a four man crew; 
 The aft CoG is exceeded if the last four remaining jumpers sit at the most aft seats and 
the JMs walk to inspect them > with rucksacks the last group of jumpers to exit shall 
not sit in the last two rows of seats in the cabin; 
 The lateral CoG is exceeded with one JM on the left side of the cabin, JM + LM on the 
right side, two jumpers sitting at the right cabin boarding step and two standing imme-
diately behind them > not more than two jumpers @ 150 kg shall be sitting or stand-
ing at the cabin door edge at the same time. 
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Figure 38. MAUW limiting: 12 jumpers (@ 100 kg), two jumpmasters, a four man 
crew and 1700 kg (850 kg +850 kg) of fuel. The CoG envelope of the NH90 is 
omitted from the graphs for classification reasons 
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Figure 39. Aft CoG limiting: the first three cabin seat rows (six seats) are empty and 
the remaining seats occupied. The CoG envelope of the NH90 is omitted from the 
graphs for classification reasons 
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Figure 40. It is also allowed to have the last remaining four jumpers all at the right 
cabin door edge at the same time. At least one occupant has to sit on the left 
side. The CoG envelope of the NH90 is omitted for classification reasons) 
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MASTER TEST MATRIX 
 
Table 14. Master test matrix as written in the test plan[29]. The tests #5, #6, #9 and 
#10 (drops with anchor line in the cabin ceiling) were eventually not done as un-
safe with the T-10 static lines 
# Test item 
H/C Configu-
ration & cargo 
Flight conditions 
Alti-
tude 
(AGL) 
Cabin 
test 
person-
nel 
# of 
drops 
Pass criteria 
1 
Occupants’ actions:  
*before and during take off 
*before exit & during exit 
*in case of forced landing 
*in case of emergency jump 
* in case of chute opening in cabin 
* Check draft “YT-ohje” 
Anchor line on 
ceiling and on 
floor. 8 LH + 7 
RH seat conf. 
in the cabin. 
Ground test 
Ground 
test 
* LM 
* JM 
* up to 12 
parachut-
ists fully 
geared up 
NA 
The positioning and transi-
tions shall be such that:  
* the JM & LM can control the 
situation at all times.  
* There is no inherent risk of 
accidental chute opening in 
cabin in flight 
* H/C’s CoG limits are not 
violated 
2 
An “empty” static line’s behaviour ( 
one and four lines) in slipstream, 
including pulling it in 
* LG UP 
* Anchor line: 
1. on floor.  
2. on ceiling 
 
At least one T-
10 static line 
with total 
length of 5.3 
m.  
* @ 40, 50, 60, 70, 
80 KIAS 
* sideslip -1, 0, +1 
ball at each speed 
 300 ft 
*LM 
* JM 
* video 
NA 
SL with either anchor line 
position: 
*No objectionable sporadic 
behaviour 
* No objectionable contact 
with H/C structure 
* No snagging of the SL while 
pulling in by the JM  
3 
Dropping dummies with anchor line 
on the floor 
 one dummy per jump run 
* LG UP 
*FDF anchor 
line on the 
floor 
* 4 dummies 
with T-10 type 
parachutes / 
load 
* 40, 60, 70, 80 
KIAS 
 
Notes: 
 * 2 dummies from 
each airspeed 
* only one dummy 
connected to the 
anchor line at the 
time. 
* Parachutes for 
test crew 
 
3000ft 
* LM 
* JM1 
* JM2 
* video 
8 
*Safe separation of the 
dummies 
*No objectionable behaviour 
of the static line(s) (esp. up 
swing towards MR) 
* No objectionable contact 
with H/C structure 
* No snagging of the SL while 
pulling in by the JM 
* No objectionable behaviour 
of the anchor line 
4 
Dropping dummies with anchor line 
on the floor 
  four dummies per jump run 
* LG UP 
*FDF anchor 
line on the 
floor 
* 4 dummies 
with T-10 type 
parachutes / 
load 
* 60, 80 KIAS (TBC 
by expecience) 
 
Notes:  
* all four dummies 
dropped on one 
jump run 
 
1500ft 
* LM 
* JM1 
* JM2 
* video 
8 As above 
Items #5 and #6 are only be done if the clearance with the SL and the MR is estimated to be adequate based on tests #3 and #4 
5 
Dropping dummies with anchor line 
on the ceiling 
 one dummy per jump run 
* LG UP 
*Standard NHI 
anchor line on 
the ceiling 
* 4 dummies 
with T-10 type 
parachutes / 
load 
* 40, 50, 60 KIAS 
 
Notes: 
* At least 2 dum-
mies from each 
airspeed 
Note: only one 
dummy connected 
to the anchor line 
at the time. 
* Parachutes  for 
test crew 
≥ 
3000ft 
* LM 
(safety 
harness + 
para-
chute) 
* JM1 
* JM2 
* video 
8 As above 
6 
Dropping dummies anchor line on 
the ceiling 
 four dummies per jump run 
* LG UP 
*Standard NHI 
anchor line on 
the ceiling 
* 50, 60 KIAS (TBC 
by expecience) 
Note: all four 
dummies dropped 
 1500 
ft 
* LM 
(safety 
harness + 
para-
8 As above 
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* 4 dummies 
with T-10 type 
parachutes / 
load 
on one jump run chute) 
* JM1 
* JM2 
* video 
 
Select 2 3 most suitable airspeeds for dropping jumpers. Decide on how to proceed with ceiling mounted anchor line – margin to MR. 
7 
Dropping parachutists with anchor 
line on the floor 
 
 exit position sitting on the cabin 
door edge 
 one jumper per jump run, different 
speed for each 
* LG UP 
*FDF anchor 
line on the 
floor 
*4  12 
parachutists 
per load 
50, 60, 70, 80 
KIAS (based on 
previous tests) 
 
Only those jumpers 
connected to the 
anchor line who 
are about to jump 
on that run 
 1500 
ft AGL 
* LM 
* JM1 
* JM2 
* video 
*at least 4 
jumpers 
4 
*Safe separation of the 
jumpers 
*No objectionable behaviour 
of the SL (esp. up swing 
towards MR) 
* No objectionable contact 
with H/C structure 
* No snagging of the SL while 
pulling in by the JM 
* No objectionable behaviour 
of the anchor line 
8 
Dropping parachutists with anchor 
line on the floor 
 exit position standing on the 
cabin door edge 
 2 4 jumpers per run. Interval 
TBD by jumpmaster 
* LG UP 
*FDF anchor 
line on the 
floor 
*4 12 para-
chutists per 
load 
60 80 KIAS (2 3 
airspeeds based 
on previous tests) 
 
Only those jumpers 
connected to the 
anchor line who 
are about to jump 
on that run 
 1500 
ft AGL 
* LM 
* JM1 
* JM2 
* video 
* 12 
jumpers 
20 As above 
 
 # 9 and #10  – IF CONSIDERED SAFE AFTER DUMMY DROPS: 
9 
Dropping parachutists with anchor 
line on the ceiling 
 
 exit position sitting on the cabin 
door edge 
 one jumper per jump run, 4 
jumpers 
* LG UP 
*Standard NHI 
anchor line on 
the ceiling 
*4–12 para-
chutists per 
load 
40 60 KIAS (2 3 
based on previous 
tests) 
 
Only those jumpers 
connected to the 
anchor line who 
are about to jump 
on that run 
 
1500ft 
AGL 
* LM 
* JM1 
* JM2 
* video 
* 12 
jumpers 
4 As above 
10 
Dropping parachutists with anchor 
line on the ceiling 
 exit position standing on the 
cabin door edge/step 
 2 4 jumpers per run. Interval 
TBD by jumpmaster 
* LG UP 
*Standard NHI 
anchor line on 
the ceiling 
*4–12 para-
chutists per 
load 
40 60 KIAS (2 3 
airspeeds based 
on previous tests) 
 
Only those jumpers 
connected to the 
anchor line who 
are about to jump 
on that run 
 1500 
ft AGL 
* LM 
* JM1 
* JM2 
* video 
* 12 
jumpers 
20 As above 
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HAZARD LEVEL DETERMINATION 
 
The risk analysis was done in accordance with the “hazard level determination” method 
originating from the United States Naval Air Systems Command [27]. The hazard levels were 
rated for severity and probability in accordance with the guidelines identified in Table 15. 
Table 15. Test hazard levels 
Mishap Probability Hazard Severity 
A  Frequent: likely to occur imme-
diately or within a 
short period of time. 
I  Catastrophic: may cause death or 
aircraft loss. 
B  Probable: probably will occur in 
time. 
II  Critical: may cause severe 
injury or major aircraft 
damage. 
C  Occasional: may occur in time. III  Marginal: may cause minor 
injury or minor aircraft 
damage. 
D  Remote: unlikely to occur IV  Negligible: will not result in injury 
or aircraft damage. 
 
Applying the above guidelines to each test event provided the basis for making a risk 
assessment for each test event defined in the test matrix. Individual element risk categories 
were assigned using the residual risk matrix specified in Table 16. 
Table 16. Residual risk matrix 
Mishap Hazard Severity 
 
Probability I  
Catastrophic 
II  
Critical 
III  
Marginal 
IV 
Negligible 
A  Frequent UA  UA  Risk Category C Risk Category B  
B  Probable UA  Risk Category C  Risk Category C  Risk Category A  
C  Occasional Note 1 Risk Category C   Risk Category B  Risk Category A  
D  Remote Note 2 Note 2 Risk Category A  Risk Category A  
Notes: (1) The determination of a test project whose residual risk assessment falls under I/C will require up front 
discussions with TCT (Test Coordination Team) prior to proceeding with the test program development. 
 (2) Assignment of Risk Category where residual risk falls under I/D or II/D will require up front discussions 
with the TCT to determine whether Risk Category A or B is applicable. 
  
UA  Unacceptable risk, project residual risk too high to proceed. 
Risk Category C - Test or activities which present a significant risk to personnel, equipment or property, even after all precau-
tionary/corrective actions are taken. 
Risk Category B  Test or activities which present a greater risk to personnel, equipment or property than normal operations. 
Risk Category A  Test or activities which present no greater risk than normal operations. 
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HAZARD ANALYSIS SUMMARY 
The most significant hazards identified by the test team are summarized as follows:  
Damage to H/C due to contact with static line or jumper after exit 
Cause & effect: SL dynamics, damage to several possible items 
 
Precautionary Measures:  Risk to be minimised by starting at a low airspeed (40 KIAS) and 
assessing the risk with increased airspeed. In case the POS light or other part disintegrates, 
abort mission and investigate damages. When pulling in the SLs by the JM, the LM shall be 
monitoring possible contact with fuselage. The right side search light under the sponson shall 
be retracted during parachuting. 
Residual hazard level: C/III = Risk category B 
Damage to composite structure due to D-bag contact after exit 
Cause & effect: SL dynamics, up-swing against the fuselage. The inherent risk is considered 
low as there are no heavy (=metal) objects in that part of the static line or deployment bag that 
is hung outside the fuselage. Thus the impact pressure on any part of the fuselage is probably 
small even though the impact speed after up-swing could be high 
Precautionary Measures: The use of low airspeeds on the first drops and increasing the 
airspeed with small steps, continuously monitoring the SL behaviour from inside the cabin 
and from the chase H/C. 
Residual hazard level: C/III = category B 
Damage to composite cabin floor due to snap hook contact after exit 
Cause & effect: SL dynamics, probable damage to unprotected standard cabin floor with 
floor mounted anchor line.  
Precautionary Measures: As the risk of damage is high due to normal snap hook behaviour 
(slamming against the floor as the SL tightens), the Patria floor protection panels must be 
used with the floor mounted anchor line. After this, the risk is very improbable. 
Residual hazard level: D/IV =  risk category A 
Parachutist or dummy entanglement to the SL after exit (a “hangfire”) 
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Cause & effect: Exit in a rolling movement or a packing error. Parachute fails to open, 
jumper does not separate from the SL. 
Precautionary Measures: A knife to cut the SL shall be immediately available to JM and 
LM. The knife shall be immediately taken for readiness to cut the SL if circumstances so 
mandate to save the H/C. Communication between the JM and the tangled jumper – it has to 
be reminded prior test to all jumpers that opening the reserve parachute is absolutely 
forbidden when tangled to SL! (a standard parachuting procedure). Jumpmaster is to instruct 
the crew to go for a careful landing, after the situation is stable. If the reserve parachute 
opens, the SL must be cut immediately (a standard parachuting procedure). The additional 
static lines have to be pulled into the cabin before entering hover. 
Residual hazard level: D/III = Risk category A 
Accidental opening of a parachute inside the cabin 
Cause & effect: Careless movement in the cabin > handle extracted and canopy opens. In 
the worst case the canopy slips out of the door taking the jumper and a considerable part of 
the fuselage with it. This is a very dangerous situation if let to happen. 
Precautionary Measures:  The risk is minimised by using experienced parachutists for test 
jumps and by briefing the procedure on how to move inside the cabin (“protect handles, move 
slowly, if you get stuck: inform JM etc). It is also briefed (normal parachuting procedure) that 
in case an opened chute is noticed, the closest person takes control of the chute, immediately 
warns others and the closest one to the door closes it. After that, no door opening is allowed 
before landing. 
Residual hazard level: D/II = Risk category B 
Contact of static line with main rotor 
Cause & effect: This risk potentially exists with ceiling attachment of the static lines. If 
gotten stuck to the MR and if the SL or the snap hook would not fail, the anchor could be torn 
out from the cabin towards the MR. As such this would probably not be catastrophic, but if 
the anchor line would pull put other SLs and canopies, that could potentially end up in a loss 
of aircraft control and lives. 
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Precautionary Measures: With the first jumps using either attachment, the first drops are 
made with only with the floor mounted anchor line and only one static line in the anchor at 
any time. This minimises the damages should the SL tangle with MR. During the first drops 
from ceiling cable (if declared safe by the previous tests), only one SL attached to the cable at 
the time > less risk in case SL gets stuck to the MR. Emergency rescue parachutes for all 
occupants on board to minimise the risks for personnel. Emergency escape to be practiced 
before flights. 
Residual hazard level: D/II = Risk category B 
SL/deployment bag entaglement during retraction after jump 
Cause & effect: Although no obvious risk has been identified, it is possible that the static 
line’s deployment bag would get tangled before or during retraction. This risk is considered 
realistic if the static line stabilises below the sponson 
Precautionary Measures: An investigation was made with an NH90 on jacks, whether there 
were clear points for entanglement. When the landing gear was retracted, the only potential 
obstructions were the fuel system vent scoop and a thin engine start fuel vent line coming 
from the upper deck. No potential mechanism for the static line to jam the landing gear was 
seen. 
As precautions: the landing gear has to be retracted when dropping jumpers, the static lines’ 
behaviour in slipstream will be checked during test item #2, before actual jumps, the LM shall 
monitor the static line behaviour when being retracted by the JM, near the landing site, a set 
of tyres shall be ready in case the LG extension still fails for some unknown reason. In case 
the static line anyway gets tangled after a jump, the JM shall try to remove it with all suitable 
means. Communication with LM is essential. If the static line cannot be retracted, all other 
lines shall be retracted and the LG extended for landing. The JM shall control the static line(s) 
until on the ground 
Residual hazard level: B/IV = Risk category A 
 
SUMMARY: The biggest risks in the analysis above belong to the risk category B, which is 
thus the overall test risk category. The risk category B means that the planned tests cause an 
increased risk which is higher than in normal service. The tests do not cause a considerable 
risk to materiel or personnel when all the mitigation actions are implemented.  
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STATIC LINE UP-SWING WITH AIRSPEED 
Although the risks related to the static line up-swing after jumper separation were eliminated 
using the floor attached anchor, a limited comparison of the analysis and results was made as 
interesting and for future reference. The NHI’s analysis of the static line’s dynamic behaviour 
in slipstream is visualised in Figure 10. The analysis has been made using a general 
aeromechanical simulation code named GENSIM [10].  
Airspeeds of 50, 60 and 80 knots were selected for comparison as representative values of the 
tested airspeed envelope. The jumps were filmed from a chase helicopter located slightly aft 
of the test helicopter with a 50–100 meter separation. This created some parallax error which 
was taken into account by the error margins. 
Only the “Start” and “Trim” positions of the static line were taken into consideration, as with 
the floor attachment the sponson prevented the static lines rising above H/C bottom surface 
level. Thus the comparison concerning the “Max” case would have been erroneous and 
meaningless.  
Even when comparing the “Start” and “Trim” cases, some error may have been be caused by 
the different setups for the analysis and the tests. In the analysis, the static lines were mounted 
on the ceiling, whereas in the tests they were mounted on the floor. Based on the author’s 
experience on the flow dynamics around helicopter fuselages, this error was probably 
insignificant for the “Start” case and small/moderate for the “Trim” case. The only major 
variable (for a non-sideslip condition) was the downwash of the main rotor, and in forward 
flight case the downwash would be directed almost horizontally backwards, with a small 
deviation downwards. However, in hover or at low speeds this would not be the case. The 
precise effect of the main rotor downwash for the results of this comparison was left open 
within the scope of the study. 
The Figure 41 shows the calculated static line position at the time of the parachutist separation 
(Start) and Figure 43 the stabilised or trim position of the static line after the jumper has 
separated and the static line’s up-swing ended (Trim). The Figure 42 and Figure 44 show the 
respective flight test results. The jumper separation point is here defined as the moment when 
the parachute suspension lines are deployed and the canopy fabric is just starting to extract 
from the D-bag. In this case the airstream is not yet significantly deflecting the static line-D-
bag-parachute –combination backwards. 
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Figure 41. Calculated static line deviation angles at the moment of the parachutist 
separation (with floor mounted static lines), based on NHI’s analysis [10]. Angles 
for 60 and 80 knots have been measured directly from the Figure 10.  The angle 
for 50 knots was interpolated. 
 
Figure 42. The measured static line deflection angles at the time of the parachutist 
separation for 50, 60 and 80 knots. All images are from test #4 “Paratrooper 
jumps”. The 50 knots image is of test point #1, the 60 knots of test point #2 and 
the 80 knots of test point #12 (see Table 5 for details). 
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Figure 43. Calculated static line deviation angles in the ultimate or trim position (for 
floor mounted static lines), based on NHI’s analysis [10]. Angles for 60 and 80 
knots have been measured directly from the Figure 10.  The angle for 50 knots 
was interpolated. 
 
 
Figure 44. The measured static line deflection angles in the trim case for 50, 60 and 
80 knots. All images are from test #4 “Paratrooper jumps”. The 50 knots image is 
of test point #1, the 60 knots of test point #2 and the 80 knots of test point #12 
(see Table 5 for details). 
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In Figure 42 and in Figure 44 the static line deflection angles were measured against the 
geometrical vertical and horizontal (Earth coordinates), as the ambient airflow affecting the 
static line was horizontal. The use of Earth referenced coordinates also helped to overcome 
the fact that the helicopter’s longitudinal pitch angle in trimmed flight conditions varied with 
airspeed up to 6° in the tested regime. Therefore the helicopter’s fuselage would not have 
been a solid and good reference for static line deviation measurements. The Earth referenced 
horizontal and vertical were defined from the real horizon visible on the video footage. 
When the calculated and the flight test results for 50–80 knots were compared, there seemed 
to be a surprisingly good correlation. All the calculated deflection angles fit inside the test 
results, considering the error margins. The error margins were rather large (up to ±10°) due to 
the parallax error caused by the chase H/C position, the sensitivity of the “Start” angle for the 
parachute deployment phase and the fluttering of the D-bag in the “Trim”. In spite of the error 
margins the comparison was clearly indicative. The ±10 ° accuracy in defining the static 
line’s positions in this kind of an extremely complex scenario seemed sufficient with a sound 
engineering judgment. Despite the good correlation at 50–80 knots, the calculations could not 
predict all the details of the static lines dynamics. Such examples were the trim position high 
amplitude rotation at 40 knots, the flutter in trim position at all airspeeds, the effect of side 
slip and the effect of the D-bag’s longitudinal position along the fuselage (see Chapter 4.2.2). 
The most interesting calculated case, the maximum position of the static line during its 
dynamic up-swing could not be assessed in flight. However, the good correlation of the 
GENSIM calculation and the flight test results indicated, that the method and assumptions 
made in the NHI’s analysis [10] could be used to model a similar new case with a reasonable 
confidence, at least for the airspeed range of 50–80 knots. A full substantiation for this claim 
cannot be achieved until the simulation is done with the same setup (floor mounted anchor 
etc.) as what was used in these flight tests. 
